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THE CONSEQUENCES TODAY OF THE
UNITED STATES’ BRUTAL POST-9/11
INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES
PETER JAN HONIGSBERG*
INTRODUCTION
In a decision written in 1999, the Israeli Supreme Court described
an interrogation as a “ ‘competition of minds’ in which the investigator
attempts to penetrate the suspect’s thoughts and elicit from him the
information the investigator seeks to obtain.”1  It added that an interro-
gation “intrudes his conscience [and] penetrates the deepest crevices of
his soul.”2
A few paragraphs later, the court reminds the reader that a “rea-
sonable investigation is necessarily one free of torture, free of cruel,
inhuman treatment of the subject . . . .  Human dignity also includes
the dignity of the suspect being interrogated . . . .  These prohibitions
are ‘absolute.’  There are no exceptions to them and there is no room
for balancing.”3
Penetrating the minds and souls of alleged terrorists while still
upholding the constitution, federal law, and the human rights obliga-
tion to treat the suspects with dignity and without torture or cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment was not the immediate objective for
high-ranking American officials and military interrogators in the early
years following the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and
the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001.  Although
the United States was a party to the Geneva Conventions (GC), the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the
Convention Against Torture (CAT)—all three of which prohibit torture
and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment (CIDT)—the U.S. chose
to ignore the restrictions of these documents.4  Propelled by the fear of
* Peter Jan Honigsberg is a professor at the University of San Francisco School of
Law and founder and director of the Witness to Guantanamo project (W2G).  More infor-
mation about W2G can be found at http://www.witnesstoguantanamo.com.  He is
immensely grateful to California attorney Wendy Betts, whose outstanding research and
in-depth knowledge of human rights issues were invaluable to his writing of this article.
Professor Honigsberg also wishes to thank librarian extraordinaire Lee Ryan and also
Hannah Lynch and Alaina Piland for their invaluable assistance.  All Witness to Guanta-
namo project interviews are in the possession of the author.
1. Supreme Court of Israel: Judgment Concerning the Legality of the General Security Service’s
Interrogation Methods, 38 I.L.M. 1471, 1481 (1999).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1482.
4. See S. REP. NO. 113-288 (2014), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/de
fault/files/documents/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf (focusing on how the CIA tortured detain-
ees at black sites around the world post-9/11).  This article concentrates on torture and
harsh treatment committed by the Department of Defense.
29
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another attack comparable to that of September 11th,5 the administra-
tion violated these treaties, focusing instead on the short-term goal of
obtaining intelligence at any cost to deter another major attack.6
Today, anyone who has followed the evolution of U.S. interroga-
tion methods post-9/11 knows all too well that the United States pur-
sued an admitted policy of harsh treatment, which has been defined by
many commentators as comparable to CIDT and torture.7  And the dev-
astating consequences of our unlawful behavior have become evident
over the years.
In order to find actionable intelligence, the Department of
Defense (DoD) acted inconsistently, irrationally, ineffectively, and,
when conducting abusive interrogations, illegally.  Because the U.S. mil-
itary did not know what techniques would succeed, it attempted a pleth-
ora of short-term strategies and untested interrogation techniques.  The
initial interrogation tactics and procedures have been described as “ad
hoc [and] very helter-skelter.”8
In addition, it often did not even matter which interrogation tech-
nique was applied, how much force was used, or even who was being
interrogated.  As one expert told the Witness to Guantanamo project,9
the screening process of determining which captives actually had intelli-
gence value was “terrible” and many of the detainees sent to Guanta-
namo had neither prosecutorial nor intelligence value.10
Tensions existed between experienced federal law enforcement
agents and the DoD, where often young and inexperienced military
5. Interview with Lawrence Wilkerson in Wash., D.C. (Mar. 19, 2011).
6. S. REP. NO. 113-288 (2014), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf.
7. Zachariah Rivenbark, Torture Allegations, JURIST (July 20, 2013, 10:39 AM), http:/
/www.jurist.org/feature/2013/07/guantanamo-bay-torture-allegations.php; see also Patri-
cia Zengerle, CIA’s ‘Harsh Interrogations’ Exceed Legal Authority, Report Finds, HUFFINGTON
POST (Apr. 10, 2014, 11:47 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/11/cia-harsh-
interrogations_n_5130218.html; Deb Riechmann, Bush Declares: ‘We Do Not Torture’, WASH.
POST (Nov. 7, 2005, 11:39 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti-
cle/2005/11/07/AR2005110700521.html; The Vice President appears on Meet the Press with
Tim Russert, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 16, 2001), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives
.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html (announcing that it was
necessary to “work, though, sort of the dark side”).
8. Interview with Manuel Supervielle, General Counsel, U.S. Army, in S.F., Cal.
(Sept. 8, 2012).  In one example provided by Supervielle, intelligence agencies interro-
gated for intelligence on the war, while law enforcement built and prosecuted cases with-
out coordinating their processes and interests.  Consequently, law enforcement read
detainees their rights.  Then when intelligence interrogated the same detainees, the
detainees would say that they had the right not to talk.
9. The Witness to Guantanamo project has filmed interviews with 132 former
detainees and others who have lived or worked or are otherwise connected to Guanta-
namo.  The project has interviewed prison guards, interrogators, interpreters, chaplains,
habeas lawyers, JAG lawyers, prosecutors, medical personnel, psychologists, FBI agents,
CIA personnel, NCIS officials, high-ranking military officials, high-ranking government
officials, and family members of the detainees. WITNESS TO GUANTANAMO, http://witness-
toguantanamo.com (last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
10. Interview with Mark Fallon, Chief of Counterintelligence Operations for the
Europe, Africa, and Middle East Divisions of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, in
S.F., Cal. (Oct. 25, 2013).
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soldiers and reservists who did not have the proper training, interro-
gated alleged terrorist prisoners.11  In Bagram, Afghanistan, where
many detainees were sent before being transported to Guantanamo,
inexperienced and aggressive military interrogators were given wide lat-
itude.12  Federal law enforcement agents––who focused on “rapport-
based” (also known as rapport-building) interrogations––contrasted
with the military’s harsh techniques, including such techniques as “fear
up,”13 “pride up and ego down,” and “ego down harsh.”14
According to the Army Field Manual, there is a fine line between
lawful and unlawful conduct that can be determined in part by two tests
to consider in making the determination as to whether an interrogator
has crossed the line.15  In the early years post-9/11, the military either
ignored the safeguards that the tests provided or defined its strategies
and interrogation tactics very broadly in order to avoid colliding with
the tests’ safeguards.  As David Becker, the head of the Department of
Homeland Security Human Intelligence Services, noted, interrogation
approaches were limited to the imagination of the interrogators.16
11. Id.
12. Tim Golden, In U.S. Report, Brutal Details of 2 Afghan Inmates’ Deaths, N.Y. TIMES
(May 20, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/20/world/asia/in-us-report-brutal-
details-of-2-afghan-inmates-deaths.html.
13. Interview with Jim Clemente in S.F., Cal. (June 13, 2013); see also infra Part II.
14. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 34-52, INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION
(1992) at 3-12, 3-16–3-18 (showing that similar phrases such as fear up/down and pride/
ego up/down, as well as developing rapport appear in both the 1992 Army field and its
replacement in the 2006 Manual); see also id. at 1–9 (outlining prohibited conduct and a
test for the interrogator to determine whether his conduct is lawful or unlawful); see also
Interview with Mark Fallon, supra note 10; see also Interview with Jim Clemente in S.F., Cal.
(June 13, 2013); see also Pratrap Chatterjee, An Interrogator Speaks Out, ALTERNET (Mar. 6,
2005), http://www.alternet.org/print/story/21423/an_interrogator_speaks_out.  Torin
Nelson, an interrogator who worked in Guantanamo in 2002 and who interviewed with
W2G (see infra Part II) explained these and other interview techniques used by the mili-
tary.  Nelson noted that Army manual FM 34-52 listed seventeen methods of interroga-
tion.  These included “Direct Approach,” “Silence,” “Rapid Fire,” “Pride and Ego Up,”
“Pride and Ego Down,” “Fear Up Mild,” and “Fear Up Harsh.”  In the article, Nelson
explained several of these techniques: “Fear Up Harsh” is the most heavy-handed tech-
nique.  It involves yelling, accusing the subject of lying and banging one’s fist on the table.
“Fear Up Mild” might involve pulling out a file and reciting the information in a calm
voice—where they were caught, the charges being brought against them, such as carrying
a weapon while not in uniform, and the possible consequences.  “ ‘Pride and Ego Down’ is
revealing that you know they were caught in an embarrassing situation.”  This technique
might involve divulging knowledge that the subject was caught dressed in women’s cloth-
ing to get across a checkpoint, or that he had failed to save the life of a colleague.
According to the former interrogator, “you might make fun of them or you might prom-
ise to erase it from the record.  More often that not, you use ‘Pride & Ego Up,’ because
your subject is [already] shattered emotionally, so you build up their morale, say they’ve
acted like a hero.’”  The “Rapid Fire” technique involves two or three interrogators asking
questions simultaneously.
15. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 34-52, INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION
(1992) at 1–9.  Both tests centered on whether U.S. or international law would be, or was
being, violated.
16. The Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody: Hearing on S. Before the Comm. on Armed
Services, 110th Cong. (2008).
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A number of federal agencies represented the split in the
approach to interrogations.  The FBI, the Counter Intelligence Task
Force (CITF), and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS),17
supporting the rapport-based strategies, were on one side.  The DoD
leadership and the CIA were on the other side.18  In the early years, the
military advocated and implemented harsh interrogation methods that
were counterproductive to intelligence gathering.  For example, when a
detainee provided valuable evidence to the FBI, the DoD would often
demand to take over the interrogation of the detainee and apply its
harsh interrogation methods.  The rapport that the FBI created with
the suspect was then often destroyed, and the detainee would no longer
cooperate with anyone, including the FBI.19
The military’s abusive, punitive, and unlawful interrogation tactics
over a decade ago, during the years 2002–2003, led to damaging unin-
tended consequences that are still with us today.  Other headlining
events such as the beheadings of American and British citizens by the
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, known as ISIS or ISIL, may overshadow
and divert attention away from the short-term interrogation techniques
post-9/11.  However, these post-9/11 techniques continue to impact
and inform our world today.  For example, ISIS has forced the men it
has beheaded to wear the orange jumpsuit associated with what detain-
ees wear in Guantanamo.  Major long-term consequences include:
(1) We have been unable to successfully prosecute and convict
detainees after subjecting them to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treat-
ment, as well as torture.  As a result, the detention center in Guanta-
namo Bay, Cuba––which President Bush wanted to close in 2008 and
President Obama proclaimed he would close on his second day of
office in 2009––remains open.  Eighty-nine detainees continue to be
held at the detention center, thirty-five of whom have been cleared for
release;
(2) Noncombat personnel who worked with detainees suffered
PTSD;
(3) By ignoring and circumventing the Geneva Conventions, the
Convention Against Torture, and the International Covenant on Civil
17. Interview with David Brant, Director NCIS, in Wash., D.C. (Mar. 11, 2011).
Although the NCIS is part of the DoD, it split with the DoD leadership regarding the use
of the implementation of harsh interrogations in 2002 and 2003.
18. The CIA carried out the administration’s policy of “extraordinary rendition.”
CIA agents seized alleged high-value detainees and transported them to other countries
or to CIA controlled black sites where they were brutalized and tortured. See PETER JAN
HONIGSBERG, OUR NATION UNHINGED: THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR ON TERROR
Part IV (2009).  Because W2G has interviewed several military interrogators who worked
in Bagram and Guantanamo, but no CIA interrogators who admitted participating in
extraordinary rendition, this article will focus on military interrogations.  W2G did inter-
view, however, three former detainees who were held in CIA black sites.  Their stories will
briefly appear following the Guantanamo section in Part I.
19. Interview with Mark Fallon, supra note 10.  As Fallon explained it, “[w]e would
make progress with the detainee at some point and find that the JTF [military] folks went
in the middle of the night and started interrogating them very harshly.  It would disrupt
the progress we made and we’d have to rehabilitate” them and had essentially taken a few
steps backward.
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and Political Rights, we abandoned the rule of law and human rights at
home and suffered serious costs to our reputation abroad.  That is,
America has lost its standing and reputation as the world’s foremost
defender of human rights and the rule of law.  Other nations now
believe that we have given them permission to replicate our shameful
behavior in treating their own captives.20
When countries are not mindful of their behaviors, they suffer
going forward.  The U.S. cannot move on and return to its position as
the defender of human rights and the rule of law until it has taken full,
unambiguous, and unequivocal responsibility for the abusive
interrogations.
Part I of this article discusses, through the voice of a former inter-
rogator, as well as with references to government and military docu-
ments the “anything goes” attitude toward obtaining intelligence
through the military’s short-term interrogation tactics following 9/11.
This attitude was prevalent in Bagram, Afghanistan, and in Guanta-
namo Bay, Cuba in both 2002 and 2003.  Additionally, this attitude was
reflected in abusive detention practices, intended to soften up the
detainees, making them less resistant in interrogations. Part II
describes, through the voices of several interrogators, law enforce-
ment’s alternative approach to gathering intelligence through the more
mindful and humane rapport-based interrogation tactics.  This section
will discuss the attempts to integrate the rapport-based approach into
military interrogations, the initial rejection of that approach and its sub-
sequent adoption by 2004. Part III sets out and explains the long-term,
injurious, and costly unintended consequences of the short-term brutal
interrogation tactics.  It also suggests how we can correct the wrongs
and return the U.S. to its former position as the world’s leader on
human rights and the rule of law.
The Witness to Guantanamo project (W2G)21 was fortunate to film
interviews with five interrogators.  The project also interviewed 50
detainees who spoke of their treatment while held at American bases in
Kandahar and Bagram, Afghanistan, and in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
The project spoke to civilian habeas lawyers and military JAG (Judge
Advocate General) lawyers who represented the detainees, military
prosecutors, and many other people who lived and worked in Guanta-
namo.  These included prison guards, medics, interpreters, interro-
gators, and chaplains.  The project also interviewed many high-ranking
government and military officials.  All of these people provided insights
into the tactics of the jailers and their treatment of the detainees.
Through 132 interviews, we can paint a picture of the evolution of inter-
rogations post-9/11 beginning with the harsh approach adopted by the
military in early 2002 up to the military’s transition to the more
humane law enforcement approach in 2004.
20. Tom Malinowski, Absent Moral Authority, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 1, 2004, 7:00
PM), http://www.hrw.org/de/news/2004/02/01/absent-moral-authority; Jeffrey K. Cas-
sin, United States’ Moral Authority Undermined: The Foreign Affairs Costs of Abusive Detentions, 4
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 421, 447 (2006).
21. See WITNESS TO GUANTANAMO, supra note 9.
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Although commentators and researchers have identified the
breadth and boundaries of the interrogations throughout the early
years after 9/11,22 no one has painted the picture through the words of
identified and named interrogators who conducted them.  The interro-
gators who spoke to the Witness to Guantanamo project provided fasci-
nating insights into the processes of their interrogations.  The
interrogators gave firsthand accounts of whether and how their interro-
gation methods worked in attaining their goals of obtaining credible
and actionable intelligence that would be of assistance to the national
security of the United States.
Because these named interrogators are telling their stories in their
own words, their stories are unique.  Although the interrogators have
spoken in other forums including congressional and government inves-
tigations, as well as in military tribunals, much of the information in this
article is not found to the same extent and detail anywhere else in the
literature.  These three men and one woman tell a remarkable story of
the evolution of interrogations in those early years after the attacks on
September 11, 2001.
PART I. SHORT-TERM ABUSIVE AND PUNITIVE INTERROGATION
PRACTICES IN AFGHANISTAN AND GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA,
2002 – 2003
A. Afghanistan
In his interview with the Witness to Guantanamo project, former
German detainee of Turkish descent, Murat Kurnaz told how he was
treated while held at the Kandahar Air Force Base in Afghanistan.  For
five days, the American authorities hung him on chains.  His legs were
shackled.  Twice a day, he was lowered for medical personnel to
examine his eyes and fingernails.  When he was lowered, an interroga-
tor asked him to sign papers admitting to being a “terrorist.”  He
refused each time, and was hoisted back up.  On the third day, Kurnaz
passed out.  While hanging and still conscious, he observed a man
hanging in front of him.  His face was beaten so badly that Kurnaz
could not identify him.  The man died on the second day of Kurnaz’s
ordeal.  Kurnaz told W2G that he thought he was “next.”  He added,
I was sure I could be the next one because it’s a place with no
rules and the only rule is that they can make everything what they
want to and nobody except those people who were working there
know anything what’s going on, nobody knows.  So it’s a place
with no rules and there everything can happen.23
The interrogation practices described by one interrogator in this Part I
were without rules.  Many of the interrogators in Afghanistan in 2002
22. See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, THE REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION PRO-
JECT’S TASK FORCE ON DETAINEE TREATMENT (2013).
23. Interview with Murat Kurnaz in Bremen, Ger. (Aug. 19, 2009).
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participated in the harsh kinds of treatments detainees suffered.24  And
the one interrogator we profile in this section personified the brutal
approach.
In the days immediately following the United States Armed Forces’
entry into Afghanistan in late 2001, captured alleged terrorists were
transported to Kandahar Air Base.  Kandahar was the only American
prison in operation in Afghanistan at that time.  Bagram Air Base was
opened as a temporary facility in January 2002.25  Bagram became a
permanent “collection and interrogation point” and then hub for the
U.S. government’s global detention and rendition practices in May of
that year.26  It soon replaced Kandahar as the principle site for prisoner
detention in Afghanistan.27  However, in the very early days of 2002,
Kandahar held most of the captives, and Bagram held relatively few.28
However, in May 2002, Bagram was designated as the “primary collec-
tion and interrogation point,” while Kandahar became a “short term
detention facility.”29  The military stopped using Kandahar as a major
detention facility in June 2002, while the number of detainees sent to
Bagram increased.30
Because Bagram replaced Kandahar as the major detention center
in Afghanistan, and because the interrogator we interviewed worked at
Bagram, this article will focus on the detention center at Bagram Air
Base.
Bagram was a cavernous converted aircraft machine shop.31  There
were five wire cages on the main floor.32  Approximately twenty people
were in each cage, sleeping on foam mats spread on the ground.33
Plastic buckets served as toilets.34  Prisoners passed through crude rope-
operated sally ports for shackling on their way to interrogation.35
Along one wall was a catwalk for guards and interrogators to observe
the detainees.36  Isolation rooms and isolation cells were on the second
floor.37
24. See Salena Salcedo, Special Court-Martial Order, No. 23 (Nov. 9, 2005); see also
Jamie Sterling, Military interrogator pleads guilty to Afghan detainee assault, JURIST TWENTY
(Aug. 23, 2005), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2005/08/military-interrogator-pleads-
guilty-to.php; see also Alexandria Samuel, Army interrogator charged with abusing Afghan
detainees to plead guilty, JURIST TWENTY (Sept. 28, 2005), http://jurist.org/paperchase/
2005/09/army-interrogator-charged-with-abusing.php.
25. Reprieve, Briefing: Bagram Airbase Prison 1 (Aug. 14, 2009) (on file with
author).
26. Id. at 1.
27. Id.
28. AMNESTY INT’L, U.S.A. OUT OF SIGHT, OUT OF MIND, OUT OF COURT, THE RIGHT
OF BAGRAM DETAINEES TO JUDICIAL REVIEW 6 (Feb. 18, 2009).
29. Id. at 6.
30. Id.
31. Reprieve, supra note 25, at 4.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 4–5.
34. Id. at 5.
35. Lisa Hajjar, Bagram, Obama’s Gitmo, MIDDLE EAST RESEARCH AND INFO. PROJECT
(2011), http://www.merip.org/mer/mer260/bagram-obamas-gitmo#_6.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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Reprieve, a highly-respected London-based human rights nongov-
ernmental organization that advocates on behalf of prisoners world-
wide, collected data on the treatment of prisoners in Bagram in
2002–2003.  The torture and CIDT they found included goggling and
shackling detainees, stripping detainees naked, forbidding them to
look at each other, humiliating them, stepping on the neck of a pros-
trate detainee, kicking a detainee in the genitals, forcing a detainee to
kiss the boots of an interrogator, forcing a detainee to pick out bottle
caps out of a drum mixed with excrement and water, depriving detain-
ees of sleep for weeks, chaining detainees to ceilings and doors, forcing
them to stand while wearing hoods or spray-painted goggles, subjecting
them to electrocution and beatings with whips, beatings with baseball
bats in a practice referred to as “beat down,” feeding the detainees very
little, adjusting room temperatures from one hundred degrees to ten
degrees, dousing the detainees with freezing water in the winter result-
ing in frostbite and amputation, subjecting them to light deprivation,
using dogs, threatening mock executions and rape, placing detainees in
prolonged isolation for up to a year, interrogating them while they
could hear the terrifying screams of others, and desecrating the
Quran.38
B. Damien Corsetti and the Early Interrogation Period Limited Only by An
Interrogator’s Imagination in Bagram
Damien Corsetti arrived in Bagram on July 29, 2002.39  He was sent
as an interrogator, although his training had been in military intelli-
gence.  His training as an interrogator was limited to two weeks in Fort
Polk, Louisiana, with no training after arriving in Afghanistan.40  He
told the Witness to Guantanamo project that he was sent by the U.S. as
an agent of America’s anger.  He was there to carry out America’s
demand for revenge.41  The military placed this young man of twenty-
two, still coming of age, with little to no training and a volatile personal-
ity, in this exceptionally complex and stressful position.  His mission was
to interrogate “high-value” detainees to obtain actionable intelligence.
As the representative of America, he embodied, internalized, and
embraced America’s anger.  Nevertheless, when he first arrived, he was
terrified.  “I was scared of the whole horror of war,” he said.42
When Corsetti enlisted in 2000, he had asked to be placed in intel-
ligence services.  He intended to sidestep combat.  The military, realiz-
ing that he was smart, accepted him into a counter-intelligence/human
intelligence collection, an overt espionage operation.43  But after 9/11,
38. Reprieve, supra note 25, at 6–7.
39. Interview with Damien Corsetti in Savannah, Ga. (Apr. 16, 2013).
40. Investigating Officer’s Report of Testimony of Jennifer N. Higginbotham,
Appendix A, Charge 1, Specification 2 (Dec. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Testimony of
Higginbotham].
41. Interview with Damien Corsetti in Savannah, Ga. (Mar. 4, 2013).
42. Interview with Damien Corsetti, supra note 39.
43. Interview with Damien Corsetti, supra note 41.  A human intelligence collector
does more than conduct interrogations.  According to the U.S. Army, an intelligence col-
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everything changed.  The military, having been caught as unaware as
everyone else, initiated unmindful, on-the-fly44 policies, and redirected
Corsetti into interrogation of “high-value detainees.”
Corsetti was “super angry”45 after seeing the damage to the Penta-
gon.  And he carried that super anger with him on the plane to
Bagram.  Apparently, the military either never assessed or inadequately
assessed whether Corsetti had the maturity and character appropriate
for the role of an effective interrogator.46  Whether Corsetti was the
best they could find, or even an appropriate choice, was never clear.
He told W2G: “You’re like, I’m going to go over there and I’m going to
have to go kill some poor motherfucker and he’s going to be trying to
kill me and what good can come of this?”47
Corsetti may not be typical of the military interrogators in Bagram,
but he is not unique.  In the years following, the government prose-
cuted and convicted three former military interrogators and three
guards in Bagram for mistreating the detainees.48  Interrogators were
also accused of the death of two Afghani detainees, Dilawar and
Habibullah.49  W2G only interviewed one of the other interrogators,
Glendale Walls.
Walls told W2G that he was the main interrogator for Dilawar, and
that Dilawar was put on sleep deprivation, where he would be hand-
cuffed to the ceiling of his cell with his feet on the floor, but so that he
could not bend his knees.  Walls described sleep deprivation as allowing
lector, among other tasks, supervises and conducts debriefings, interrogations, and elicita-
tions for positive intelligence and force protection information; screens human
intelligence sources and documents; exploits captured enemy documents, foreign lan-
guage and open source publications; and conducts liaison and coordination in foreign
language with host nation agencies. See generally Human Intelligence Collector, ARMY.COM,
http://army.com/info/mos/human-intelligence-collector.
44. Interview with Mark Fallon, supra note 10.
45. Interview with Damien Corsetti, supra note 39.
46. Id. Even when Corsetti was young, he knew that he “wanted to do his own
thing.  [He] was bored with society’s norms.”  He grew up outside Washington, D.C., in a
middle class family.  He knew that school was not for him.  “I would rather smoke pot and
play the Nintendo than go to class and so I was really lacking a lot of discipline.”  In
September 2000, at the age of 20 and realizing that he would not obtain college and
graduate degrees, Corsetti decided that to obtain decent work without the education, he
needed a security clearance.  His choices were either becoming a defense contractor or
working for a government agency.  He chose the army because he could enroll into a
counterintelligence program.  “It was very important to [him] to have a top secret clear-
ance for jobs after leaving the military.”  His long-term goals did not include the military.
Rather, “[he] wanted to be James Bond.”
47. Id.
48. See Sterling, supra note 24; see also Holly Manges Jones, US interrogator demoted for
assaulting Afghan prisoner, JURIST TWENTY (Aug. 4, 2005), http://jurist.org/paperchase/
2005/08/us-interrogator-demoted-for-assaulting.php; Tom Henry, US soldier sentenced to 3
months, demoted in Afghan assault, JURIST TWENTY (May 23, 2005), http://www.jurist.org/
paperchase/2005/05/us-soldier-sentenced-to-3-months.php; Associated Press, Soldier Gets
75 Days in Afghan Abuse Case, MILITARY.COM (Aug. 31, 2005), http://www.military.com/
NewsContent/0,13319,76351,00.html?ESRC=eb.nl.
49. Golden, supra note 12.  The murder of Dilawar, an innocent taxi driver, was
memorialized in the Academy Award winning film, Taxi to the Dark Side.  Corsetti was not
involved the killing of either man.
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“two hours of sleep.  But it didn’t have to be consecutive.  So it could
have been 10 minutes here, you know, stretched throughout the day.”
Walls told W2G, “In my eyes, like I had no reason to believe that
he’d ever die from anything that was going on that I was aware of.  I was
aware that they had him on the sleep dep chart, the sleep deprivation
chart.  At some point, Dilawar was hallucinating that his wife had visited
him.”  He continued, “And I asked that he’d be removed because basi-
cally he’s speaking gibberish at this point.”  Walls added that at that
point Dilawar “was barely there anymore.”
Walls also told W2G that, although he had not seen it happen, one
of the military police officers had given Dilawar “personal knee strikes.”
In describing the knee strikes he said, “I guess it’s a strike to the back of
the knee which eventually formed a blood clot that went to his heart.”
When we asked what he had thought when Dilawar died, he told us, “I
thought it was some kind of freak accident or something.”50
Years later, when Corsetti was tried for crimes he allegedly commit-
ted as an interrogator, a witness described Corsetti as taking the “role of
the intimidator, because he was much larger than the rest of us.”51  The
same witness understood that he had been known in Bagram as the
“King of Torture.”52  The witness, Jennifer Higginbotham, was a fellow
interrogator.53  She testified after she was granted immunity.54  She
stated that SSG Loring, the Platoon Sergeant responsible for the inter-
rogators at Bagram, had employed Corsetti as the intimidator and had
also referred to Corsetti as the “King of Torture.”55  According to Hig-
ginbotham, Corsetti “acknowledged that he was known as the ‘King of
Torture.’”56
Corsetti described his training as approach training, rather than
textbook training.57  That is, his superiors told him, “[h]ere will be a
good way to do this . . . .  [T]his is how it is done here and just do it.”58
Nobody questioned the training, even though this training was without
standard operating procedures.59
50. Walls was prosecuted for assault and battery.  He described the assault as grab-
bing Dilawar’s shirt, and the battery as moving Dilawar against his will.  Walls agreed to
plea, and was sentenced to two months in military prison in Fort Lewis, Washington, a
reduction in pay grade, and a $750 fine.  He was also given a bad conduct discharge and
lost all military benefits such as the GI bill and VA healthcare.
51. Sworn statement of Jennifer N. Higginbotham at 26 [hereinafter Higginbotham
Sworn Statement].
52. Id. at 24.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 1.
55. Id. at 24, 26.
56. Id. at 24.  When W2G asked Corsetti about being the “King of Torture,” he told
us that he had not heard the term before she said it at his trial.  However, he said that he
had great respect for Higginbotham and believed that she thought she was telling the
truth.  He did not consider her histrionic or malicious.  He found her integrity to be
above reproach.  To Corsetti, Higginbotham was merely repeating what someone else had
said. Interview with Damien Corsetti, supra note 39.
57. Interview with Damien Corsetti, supra note 39.
58. Id.
59. See Higginbotham Sworn Statement, supra note 51, at 6.
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Corsetti worked twelve-hour days.60  He had complete control over
the prisoners.61  The Department of Defense (DoD) phoned the base
daily with particular requests for information, usually focusing on spe-
cific prisoners.62  The DoD did not care how the interrogators obtained
the information.  That was the interrogators’ domain.  Interrogators
could do what they needed to do to satisfy the DoD’s demands for
actionable intelligence.
During the interrogations, the interrogators explained to the
detainees that everything was a privilege, including their clothing.63
Detainees went to the restroom, ate and drank, and even slept with the
interrogators’ consent.64
If Corsetti did not like what he was hearing from a detainee, or if
the detainee chose to say nothing, Corsetti had no problem in turning
up the heat.  For example, he would punch detainees in the stomach or
put his crotch up against their faces.  He would make them sit in a stress
position for five hours without moving, while he sat by smoking, dump-
ing his ashes into the man’s pockets.65  He kept one detainee on his
knees for two hours, while he read a book and spat on him.66  Corsetti
admitted that when Sgt. Higgenbotham testified that Corsetti would sit
on a detainee’s chest, even though he did not remember doing it,
instead, he stated it “[s]ounds like something I would do.”67  He wore
$300 gloves so he would not get their sweat on him when he manhan-
dled the prisoners.68
Corsetti’s notes disappeared before his trial occurred.  The last
thing he and the other interrogators did when they left was burn all
their books, he told W2G.69  Interrogations were never videotaped.70
After working for a few months, presumably gathering actionable
intelligence, Corsetti began to wonder whether all the men he was
interrogating were actually connected to the attacks.  It seemed to him
that a number of the captives were swept up in a wide net, and did not
belong at Bagram.  They had little to nothing to offer.71
60. Interview with Damien Corsetti, supra note 41.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. According to Sgt. Higginbotham, the military substituted the term “safety posi-
tions” for “stress positions.” Higginbotham Sworn Statement, supra note 51, at 18.  How-
ever, the positions were seen as “safety” for the interrogator, not the detainee.  “You never
feel completely safe,” she testified. Id. at 19.  Corsetti agreed.  According to Higginbot-
ham, stress or safety positions included requiring the detainee to kneel with his hands
behind his head, sit on an invisible chair or wall, or stand with his feet more than shoul-
der width apart. Id. at 18.
66. Interview with Damien Corsetti, supra note 39.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Fallon confirmed this.  The reality was that they weren’t terrorists.  At the time
of 9/11, the estimate range or the number of people who would consider al Qaeda proba-
bly range between two and four hundred. Interview with Mark Fallon, supra note 10.
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Around the same time, Corsetti and a few of his colleagues began
to question the tactics they used to obtain information.  He wondered
out loud whether they were violating the GC, which, in requiring
humane treatment of all captives, forbids torture and cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment.  Corsetti’s supervisor arranged a meeting
with the military’s JAG lawyers.72  The military lawyers explained to Cor-
setti and the other interrogators that they were not violating American
law or the GC and could continue with their interrogation
techniques.73
Because Corsetti had received training in the GC before he arrived
in Afghanistan, he questioned that legal advice.  However, he also knew
that if he did not comply, after being advised that his interrogation
practices were legal, he would be disciplined, and perhaps prosecuted,
for not following orders.  Consequently, he continued his abusive intel-
ligence-gathering techniques.
Corsetti began to reflect and continued to understand over the
years that, “the treatment of the prisoners would create the terrorists
tomorrow.”74  You figure out very early that there are “innocent people
here” who should have been released.75  He added, “I treat my dog
better than we treat the prisoners and all that[ the treatment of the
prisoners is] going to do is grow animosity in the future.”76
After Corsetti served seven months in Afghanistan, he was posted
to Iraq.77  On October 6, 2005, Corsetti returned home from Iraq, with
so many ribbons that he “looked like a general.”78  However, within
twenty-four hours after his return, he was placed in handcuffs.  He was
arrested for the mistreatment of certain detainees in Afghanistan from
August 2002 to February 2003.  The charges included dereliction of
duty, maltreatment, assault, and performing an indecent act with
another person.79
Corsetti was accused of sitting on top of a detainee, throwing gar-
bage on him, putting cigarette ash on him, walking across a detainee’s
handcuffed hands, pulling hairs out of his chest, pulling the head and
72. See also Interview with Damien Corsetti, supra note 39.
73. In spring 2002, the Bush Administration had determined that the GC did not
apply to the prisoners captured in Afghanistan. See Memorandum from George W. Bush,
President of the U.S., on Humane Treatment of Taliban & al Qaeda Detainees, to Dick
Cheney, Vice President of the U.S. et al. (Feb. 7, 2002), http://www.google.com/url?sa=t
&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB0QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.peg
c.us%2Farchive%2FWhite_House%2Fbush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf&ei=m0rhU9C3KM3
soASz04HIBg&usg=AFQjCNEnqX7mt9011m6m6jxHJfnGvXAM2A&bvm=bv.72389368,d
.cGU; see also Peter J. Hongisberg, Chasing ‘Enemy Combatants’ and Circumventing Interna-
tional Law: A License for Sanctioned Abuse, 12 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1 (2007).
74. Interview with Damien Corsetti, supra note 39.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. In Iraq, he worked as an intelligence officer and also conducted interroga-
tions.  He was one of the first interrogators to arrive in Abu Ghraib, although he stated
that he was not aware of the abusive actions by the MPs before the horrifying photos of
torture and CID of Iraqi prisoners were published.
78. Id.
79. General Court-Martial Order, 25 July 2006, No. 20.
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beard of a detainee, removing a detainee’s pants to expose his genitalia
to a female interrogator, bending him over a table and waving a bottle
in close proximity of his buttocks, striking the detainee in the leg,
groin, and chest with his hands and knees, showing a detainee a con-
dom and his penis and saying, “[t]his is special for you,” “[t]his is your
god,” and “I’m going to fuck you,” and placing his penis near the
detainee’s face and placing his groin against the detainee’s buttocks.80
The charges were partly based on statements by a Guantanamo
detainee, Ahmed al-Darbi.  Al-Darbi accused Corsetti of kicking him in
the stomach and groin, stepping on his handcuffed hands, showing him
a condom and telling him that he is going to rape him, as well as other
abuses.81
Jennifer N. Higginbotham testified that she had witnessed Corsetti
pulling a detainee’s beard and also sitting on a detainee.82  She indi-
cated that the interrogators were not permitted to inflict harm, or strike
a detainee except in self-defense.  However, she also testified that there
was no standard operating procedure when they first arrived.83
Corsetti said that he never pressed his penis against someone’s
face.  It was either an exaggeration or a mix-up in interpretation, he
explained.  However, he did use the detainee’s shirt as an ashtray,
plucked hairs out of his chest, poked him in the chest, poured water
over him, and made him pick up feces with latex gloves and cardboard.
Corsetti also confirmed that people were hung by their wrists.84
According to Corsetti, the other interrogators either agreed to
plead to certain charges or turned as State’s witnesses to testify against
him.85  Corsetti refused a plea bargain because the pleas included
crimes he did not believe he had committed.  He told W2G that he
would have pled to some of the charges including one assault (moving
a man’s head by his beard).86  But, he would not plead guilty to some-
thing he did not do or to a tactic that the JAG lawyers told him was not
torture or CIDT.87  Even if the tactic had been wrong, he had obtained
JAG approval.88  In discussing the charges, Corsetti explained to W2G,
“I do want to clarify that I’m not innocent of everything they accused
me of.  [However,] on a legal basis, I was innocent of everything they
accused me of.”89  Corsetti admitted that he did “some horrible things.
Legally, not really.  Legally, on paper I didn’t, but on a moral level,
ethical level, I definitely did, you know.”90
80. Id.
81. Ahmed al Darbi Dep., Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, March 8, 2006.
82. Higginbotham Sworn Statement, supra note 51, at 21.
83. Id. at 6.
84. See Interview with Murat Kurnaz, supra note 23.
85. Interview with Damien Corsetti, supra note 39; Interview with Damien Corsetti,
supra note 41.
86. Interview with Damien Corsetti, supra note 39.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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The trial was a court-martial before a jury of military officials.  He
was convinced he was going to prison.91  To his great surprise, Corsetti
was acquitted of every charge, including those to which he would have
pled guilty in a plea deal.92  He believed his acquittal was a result of jury
nullification.93  Corsetti believed that the jury was composed of people
who had been in “special operations” and understood the pressures
that the military placed on Corsetti to obtain intelligence at any cost at
that time in 2002.94
Corsetti believed that his behavior, as well as that of the other inter-
rogators, was standard policy.95  “Basically, just that everything that we
did was acceptable, that this is not the work of this loose cannon rogue
wolf Corsetti.  This was institutionalized and this is how shit went
down.”96  They made decisions “facilitated through a system.  It really
was systematic torture.”97  He compared his work and the work of the
other interrogators to working at a Ford plant: “[y]ou just fuckin’ do it
the way the assembly line’s done and you go along with it, and you
stamp your fuckin’ sheet metal and go home.  Well, my assembly line
job was in a prison with high-level prisoners and that was it.”98
When W2G asked him to describe the moral and ethical violations
that he admitted to committing, he replied,
I started not looking at these people as human and looking at
them as numbers, and looking at them as evil.  But these people,
even the terrorists, are not evil.  They’re good and evil.  They have
good and bad in them, as all of us do.  We all have our demons
and hey, they chose a different way, but you can’t really say that
you wouldn’t have turned out like that if you were raised and sent
to a Madrasah and raised in the environment that they were raised
in.  You can’t say that you would be any different . . . .  I didn’t
treat human beings like human beings . . . .  I worsened humanity
during a time of my life.99
In both of his interviews with W2G, Corsetti apologized on
camera.100
I guess I’d really want to emphasize to people that, hey, this could
be you.  If you were taken from your situation and put into this,
don’t think that your decisions would be greatly different than my
own.  I wasn’t this person when I went there.  I became this person
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Corsetti was the only person interviewed by W2G twice.
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and it was through the environment I was in that that
happened.101
C. Guantanamo Bay, Cuba102
On August 4, 2001, Mohammed al Qahtani, a Saudi citizen,
detainee number 063, was flying to the U.S. from Dubai to meet up with
colleagues.  Presumably, his intent was to join with others in flying
planes into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and perhaps
another iconic structure such as the Capitol or the White House.  How-
ever, upon his arrival in Florida, an observant and conscientious cus-
toms official turned him away and sent him back to Dubai.  Had he
been allowed into the U.S., al Qahtani would have likely been the twen-
tieth hijacker, the fifth hijacker on the plane that was forced down over
the fields in Pennsylvania.103  He was captured after 9/11 in Tora Bora,
Afghanistan, and transported to Guantanamo.104  It was after he arrived
in Guantanamo that the military made the connection between him
and the other hijackers.
In March 2006, Time Magazine released the military’s interroga-
tion log describing the torture that al Qahtani suffered in Guantanamo
in late 2002.  The log begins on November 23, 2002.  It details his day-
to-day treatment as he is psychologically and physically tortured.105  He
suffered sleep deprivation, was forced to urinate on himself; had his
head and beard shaved; was subjected to the air conditioning turned up
to freezing and then turned off so the tropical heat in the room became
stifling; felt a female intrude on his personal space, possibly touching
and fondling him; was made to wear a mask and dance while hooded;
was bombarded with white noise; was forced to look at and answer ques-
tions about bikini clad models; and endured water repeatedly poured
over his head.106
101. Interview with Damien Corsetti, supra note 39.  At the end of both interviews, it
seemed to W2G personnel that becoming accountable was transformative for Corsetti.
102. The Witness to Guantanamo project was not able to find an interrogator in
Guantanamo who had participated in harsh interrogations and was willing to talk to W2G.
The two Guantanamo interrogators, Jennifer Bryson and Torin Nelson, who agreed to
talk to W2G (see Part II), implemented the rapport-based approach.  W2G did, however,
interview former detainees and others who described some of the inhumane treatment
that they were forced to endure or observe.  The experiences of two detainees who suf-
fered extended and brutal periods of isolation are described later in this section, as are
the experiences of two detainees who were interrogated while undergoing surgery under
a local anesthetic.  Other stories of abuse told to W2G by detainees are also included in
this Part.  Accordingly, although this Part includes formerly published materials, it also
includes newly-learned information obtained from W2G interviews.  Taken together, the
formerly published materials and the newly learned information provide a rich context in
support of the article’s thesis.
103. Adam Zagorin, “20th Hijacker” Claims that Torture Made Him Lie, TIME MAGAZINE
(Mar. 3, 2006), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1169322,00.html.
104. Id.
105. Interrogation Log of Detainee 063, Mohammed al Qahtani, published by
Time Magazine, Mar. 3, 2006, http://content.time.com/time/2006/log/log.pdf.
106. All of these incidents appeared in the Interrogation Log of Detainee 063,
Mohammed al Qahtani, published by Time Magazine, June 20, 2005.  In January 2009,
Susan Crawford, the convening authority of the military commissions, dropped all
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During this same period in November, Jim Clemente, an FBI agent
then in Guantanamo,107 observed a female officer whispering into a
detainee’s ear, putting lotion on his arm, and moving her hands to the
lap of the detainee.  A marine told Clemente that the female also
grabbed the detainee’s genitals.  Given the context of Clemente’s obser-
vation, it is likely that the detainee Clemente observed was al
Qahtani.108  These details are included in a letter in which another
agent offers his own observations of the treatment of al Qahtani.109
FBI agents also reported observing how a dog was used to intimi-
date al Qahtani and how al Qahtani had been totally isolated during a
three-month period in a cell flooded with light.110  These agents
noticed that by late November 2002, al Qahtani was talking to non-exis-
tent people, reported hearing voices, and crouched in a corner covered
with a sheet—all consistent with extreme psychological trauma.111  In
addition, al Qahtani suffered severe physical consequences of his treat-
ment, including swollen extremities and a life-threatening precipitous
drop in his heart rate.112
Mark Fallon of CITF told W2G that it was with al Qahtani that the
interrogators “started going down the road that I felt was illegal.”113
Clemente described the personnel in Guantanamo as “just gung ho
U.S. military wanting to save their country, and the leaders were telling
them what to do.”  Apparently, many of the interrogators in Guanta-
namo had attitudes that were similar to those of Damien Corsetti and
others who worked in Bagram.114  Clemente was concerned that the
military would blame the abusive behavior he observed on the “lowly
‘rogue’ military personnel” similarly to what later happened in Abu
Ghraib.115
charges against al Qahtani on the grounds that he had been tortured and that the evi-
dence against him was tainted and inadmissible. William Glaberson, Case Against 9/11
Detainee Is Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/14/
washington/14gitmo.html.
107. See infra Part II on Clemente’s role in advocating for rapport-building
interrogations.
108. Letter from T.J. Harrington, Deputy Assistant Dir., Counterterrorism Division,
to Major Gen. Donald J. Ryder, Department of the Army (July 14, 2004).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Interrogation Log of Detainee 063, Mohammed al Qahtani, published by
Time Magazine, June 20, 2005.
113. Interview with Mark Fallon, supra note 10 (stating how earlier that year, CITF
had moved away from the military approach and aligned with the FBI to become a “uni-
fied team, with focus on the law enforcement, rapport-based, approach); see also Memo-
randum from Michael E. Dunlavey, Commander of the Joint Task Force 170, to
Commander Diane E. Beaver, United States Southern Command (Oct. 11, 2002).
114. Jennifer Bryson’s description of an interrogator asking her, as Team Chief, to
approve the use of strobe lights and “head-banger” music in his interrogation of a
detainee. See infra Part II, section on Jennifer Bryson.
115. In W2G conversations with Damian Corsetti, the same concept of blaming the
lowly personnel—or what Clemente described as “pushing it downhill”—happened in
Bagram as well.
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The abuse in Guantanamo went significantly beyond the abuse of
al Qahtani, and was not confined to the time the detainees spent in the
interrogation booth.  That is, the Guantanamo detention center was a
lot more than a prison of holding cells.  An important goal of the
detention center was to soften up detainees and weaken their resistance
in preparation for interrogation and intelligence gathering.116  In fact,
this objective was implemented as early as summer 2002, when Major
General Dunlavey arrived as Camp Commander.
From the start, Dunlavey intended to exploit the detainees for
their intelligence value.  As Mark Fallon explained to W2G,117 before
Dunlavey arrived, Joint Task Force (JTF) 160, which had experience in
custodial operations, governed as the jailers.  However, Dunlavey
changed the approach by creating JTF 170.  JTF 170 was designed to
directly seek intelligence from the detainees.  At the time that JTF 170
was formed, Deputy Commander Mark Fallon’s law enforcement Crimi-
nal Investigation Task Force (CITF) was responsible for the investiga-
tions.  And, CITF continued to interrogate detainees immediately after
JTF 170 was created.  But soon after JTF 170 was formed, a conflict
between General Dunlavey and CITF surfaced.118  General Dunlavey
decided he needed to control the jailing process along with the interro-
gation process, and combined JTF 160 and 170.  CITF’s law enforce-
ment approach to interrogations ended.119
Consequently, as detentions and interrogations became inter-
twined, detainees were made to suffer cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment, as well as torture.  W2G documented the CIDT and torture
and the interrelationship between detention and interrogation.  For-
mer detainees, as well as others who lived or worked at the detention
center, informed W2G of many instances of inhumane treatment at the
Guantanamo detention center, particularly during those early years
from 2002 to 2004.
For example, JAG attorney Lt. Col. David Frakt told W2G how he
noticed while reviewing military documents that his client Mohamed
Jawad, a juvenile from Afghanistan, had been moved from cell to cell
every three hours for over two continuous weeks.  This process became
known as “frequent flyer.”120  As Frakt understood it, the frequent flyer
program was designed as a sleep-deprivation technique, often used to
116. See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 22.  Geoffrey Miller supported the
use of military police to facilitate interrogation as evidenced by his recommendation that
this practice be instituted in Iraq. See also Testimony of Higginbotham, supra note 40.
Higginbotham said the same thing about Bagram in her sworn statement. See Higginbot-
ham Sworn Testimony, supra note 51.
117. Interview with Mark Fallon, supra note 10.
118. Id.  JTF 170’s operations reported to Jim Haynes and his Office of the General
Counsel.  Haynes reported directly to Rumsfeld.  CITF reported to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
119. To Fallon, the interrogators in JTF 170 had based their training on the “pride
up and ego down, and ego down harsh” approach.  Consequently, CITF moved away from
the military approach and aligned with the FBI to become a “unified team” with focus on
the law enforcement, rapport-building, approach. See infra Part II.
120. Interview with David Frakt in Irvine, Cal. (May 17, 2010).
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soften the detainees for interrogation.  That is, the program intended,
in addition to punishing detainees, to disorient them and weaken their
resistance.121
Another inhumane technique used by the military was isolation.
Michael Gelles, a psychologist who worked with the Naval Criminal
Intelligence Service explained how physical isolation could be used as
an interrogation device.  By isolating the detainee, the military pre-
vented him from having “access to lots of other people who can support
[his] being resistant.”122  Then, as Gelles explained in talking about
meetings with detainees, “if you’re going to talk and you need to have a
relationship, I want you to have it with me.  And, I want you to talk to
me . . . and that’s who you’re going to talk to for a while.”123
The problem, however, is that in isolation detainees can suffer
CIDT and even torture after only a short period of fifteen days.124  Two
detainees talked to W2G about being held in isolation for particularly
long periods.  One was held for a year, the other for over two years.
Feroz Ali Abbasi,125 from the U.K., told how he had first believed that
he could hold out during his long year of isolation and not reveal confi-
dences to the interrogators.  He kept himself going by concentrating on
one particular item each day, such as each step of his walk.  But
although he believed that he could hold out, after a year, “I broke,” he
told W2G.
Moazzam Begg, also from the U.K., was held in isolation for nearly
two years.  At one point, he was so desperate for human contact that he
asked to speak to someone.  The military sent him a psychologist.  The
psychologist asked him “have you thought about removing your trou-
sers, threading your trousers with a sheet, putting the crotched part
around your neck so you can make a strong noose, and then tying it to
the top corner of your cell and jumping off to commit suicide?”126
Another detainee was not physically isolated, but linguistically iso-
lated for not only the early years of 2002–2003, but for much of the
121.  Id.  In his interview, Frakt notes that the frequent flyer program was used both
to soften up a detainee for interrogation purposes, as well as for punishment purposes.
122. Interview with Michael Gelles in Wash., D.C., (Mar. 11, 2011).
123.  Id.
124. U.N. General Assembly, Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of
punishment, ¶ 60, U.N. Doc. A/66/268 (May 8, 2011).  Importantly, the Special Rap-
porteur of the Human Rights Council on torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment has defined prolonged solitary confinement as any period in excess of
fifteen days.  The Special Rapporteur chose this limit because some of the literature iden-
tifies harmful psychological effects of isolation that can become irreversible after fifteen
days.  The U.S has not adopted the 15-day standard.  Instead the U.S. uses a 30-day cycle
of review, but not necessarily release.  Despite the required reviews, U.S. detainees may
spend years in solitary confinement; see also Id. at ¶ 60, 61 (“In a joint report on the
situation of detainees at Guantanamo Bay, experts found that although 30 days of isola-
tion was the maximum period permissible, some detainees were returned to isolation
after very short breaks over a period of 18 months.”).
125. Interview with Feroz Ali Abbasi in London, U.K. (Aug. 7, 2010).  Mr. Ali
Abbasi was in Guantanamo from January 2002 until January 2005.
126. Interview with Moazzam Begg in Birmingham, U.K. (Aug. 17, 2009).  Mr. Begg
was in Guantanamo from February 2003 until January 2005.
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time he was in Guantanamo, until he was released in 2010.  He was
from Uzbekistan, and only spoke Uzbek.  Despite the existence of other
Uzbek speakers in Guantanamo, he was housed where the people
around him spoke only Arabic or English.127  He would awake each
morning and weep.
Another detainee told W2G how he was interrogated while under-
going surgery on his back.128  He was under a local anesthetic.  A sec-
ond detainee, Tarek Dergoul, told us a similar story of being
interrogated as military doctors surgically worked on his arm.129
Several detainees explained to W2G that they believed Guanta-
namo was designed as an experimental lab for psychological torture.
For example, a detainee from the U.K., Bisher al Rawi, noted that when
he was released his friends did not believe that he had been tortured
because they saw no physical scars on him.  As he explained to W2G, his
friends could not visibly see the psychological scars he suffered and had
continued to suffer for years after release.130
A French detainee, Mourad Benchellali, reiterated the effects of
psychological scars, also stressing that he believed Guantanamo was a
psychological prison.131  A psychological prison, he indicated, was sig-
nificantly worse than a prison whose emphasis was solely on physical
torture.  The effects of psychological torture are far more lasting, if not
permanent, he believed.
The aggressive approach to detention and interrogation at Guanta-
namo was addressed in a series of high-level policy decisions and memo-
randa.  For example, in September 2002, three DoD Behavioral Science
Consultation Team, or BSCT (Biscuit), members—Major Paul Burney,
Major John Leso, and a third person who is still publically unknown—
along with four interrogators, received military interrogation training at
Fort Bragg in North Carolina.  The interrogation training included
instruction on the “Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape” (SERE)
techniques.
The SERE program was originally created in the 1950s to train mili-
tary and special operations personnel to resist Chinese and North
Korean torture and inhumane interrogation techniques during the
Korean War.  However, in 2002, Bruce Jessen, a senior psychologist for
SERE training and working for the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency—
which trained CIA agents in “SERE derived techniques”—prepared a
report to “reverse-engineer” the SERE training.  The report’s purpose
was to apply SERE-based approaches to captives in the Global War on
127. Interview with Detainee in Riga, Lat. (Aug. 4, 2011).  For a full treatment of
the concept of linguistic isolation, see Peter Jan Honigsberg, Linguistic Isolation: A New
Human Rights Violation Constituting Torture, and Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment, 12
NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 22 (2014).
128. Interview with Brahim Yadel in Paris, Fr. (Aug. 15, 2009).
129. Interview with Tarek Dergoul in London, U.K. (Aug. 20, 2009).
130. Interview with Bisher al Rawi in London, U.K. (Aug. 2, 2011).
131. Interview with Mourad Benchellali in Lyon, Fr. (Aug. 9, 2009).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\31-1\NDE102.txt unknown Seq: 20 12-SEP-17 10:34
48 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 31
Terror.132  That is, rather than use SERE solely as a training program to
assist special operations personnel who might be captured in dangerous
war zones, the program was reviewed to see how it could be used pro-
actively in eliciting intelligence information from prisoners post 9/
11.133
A BSCT memorandum written on October 2, 2002 suggested cer-
tain detention and interrogation techniques, designed for intelligence
gathering, that were linked to the SERE training program.134  Among
the tactics used in the SERE program was one that maintained that
daily activities be provided on random schedules.  Another tactic was
the disruption of prisoners’ sleep cycles.  The same memorandum pro-
posed that detainees who resisted be limited to four hours of sleep per
day.135
The SERE-based interrogation techniques have been described as
creating a syndrome of “learned helplessness.”136  The intent was that
the detainee become more compliant when interrogated.  However,
Mark Fallon of CITF describes the effect of learned helplessness this
way: “if you put a dog in a cage and you just beat the dog for whatever
they did, they wouldn’t know it was right or wrong and they’d start com-
plying to whatever.”137  As Fallon explains, compliance is, of course,
different from cooperation.138
During that fall of 2002 and winter of 2003, personnel from the
DoD as well as the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) issued a flurry of
additional memoranda addressing interrogation tactics.  The memo-
randa, short-sighted, haphazard, and condoning an “anything goes”
approach, appeared to be issued in two streams.  One stream was
through the DoD chain of command.  The other was through the DoJ
Office of Legal Counsel and the White House, and focused on CIA
interrogations.139  All the memoranda seemed designed to document
132. Torture, Rendition, and other Abuses against Captives in US Custody, HISTORY COM-
MONS, http://www.historycommons.org/timeline.jsp?hr_types_of_abuses_performed_by_
americans=torture,_rendition,_and_other_abuses_against_captives_in_iraq,_afghani
stan,_and_elsewhere_sere_techniques&timeline=torture,_rendition,_and_other_abuses_
against_captives_in_iraq,_afghanistan,_and_elsewhere.
133. In fact, the SERE techniques are still included in a course for military person-
nel today. See Gosere, U.S. AIR FORCE, http://www.gosere.af.mil/SERE.aspx; see also Center
for Security Forces, NAVAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING COMMAND, http://www.netc.navy.mil/
centers/csf/What.htm#tab4.
134. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 22.
135. Id. at 220.
136. Id. at 206.
137. Interview with Mark Fallon in S.F., Cal. (Oct. 25, 2013).
138. Fallon believes that the decision to adopt SERE techniques was sanctioned by
the White House. Interview with Mark Fallon in S.F., Cal. (Oct. 25, 2013).
139. Although this article focuses on military interrogations in the early years of
2002-2003 in Bagram and Guantanamo, W2G interviewed three former detainees who
were brutalized by the CIA in its extraordinary rendition program, which was designed to
torture detainees while also seeking actionable intelligence from them.  Bisher al Rawi
(see above) and Jamil el-Bamma, both residents of the U.K., were held in the under-
ground, pitch black, “Dark Prison” in Kabul Afghanistan, for several weeks. Interview with
Bisher al Rawi in London, U.K. (Aug. 2, 2011); Interview with Jamil el-Bamma in London,
U.K. (Aug. 2, 2011).  The only light they saw during the entire time was when the jailor
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and support cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, as well as
torture.
Three DoD memoranda were dated October 11, 2002.  The first,
by Lt.Col. Jerald Phifer, detailed three categories of “Counter-Resis-
tance Strategies.”140  Category I included yelling, deception, and multi-
ple interrogators.  Category II included stress positions, including
standing for four hours, using false documents, isolation for up to 30
days with requests for extensions,141  interrogating in other than a stan-
dard interrogation booth, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, 20-
hour interrogations, placing a hood over the detainee during question-
ing, removing all clothing, forced removal of hair, and using individual
phobias, such as fear of dogs, to induce stress.  Category III techniques
included convincing detainee that death or severely painful conse-
quences are imminent to him or his family, exposure to cold weather or
water, use of a “wet towel and rippling water to induce the mispercep-
tion of suffocating (this was a precursor to what has become known as
waterboarding), poking in the chest or other “non-injurious” physical
contact.142
Commander Major General Michael Dunlavey then wrote to the
United States Southern Command (SouthCom) requesting permission
to approve Phifer’s Counter-Resistance strategies in order to “enhance
our efforts to extract additional information.”  He concluded that the
techniques “do not violate U.S. or international laws.”143
In the third memorandum, Senior Judge Advocate Lt.Col. Diane
Beaver justified Phifer’s Counter-Resistance Strategies under federal
law, the constitution, and international law treaties and declarations.144
Although she requested legal review of her memorandum, Beaver, nev-
ertheless, approved the Category I and II techniques.
She also approved Category III techniques, although she requested
that the Commanding General and the Commander of SouthCom also
walked by with a dim flashlight to briefly check on them, and toss them food.  On the first
day, Bisher, not being able to see anything, kicked over his “honey bucket.”  The sensory
deprivation suffered by these men was severe.  Both men quickly lost all sense of time and
space.  Mamdouh Habib, an Australian national, was held incognito, beaten severely and
tortured in Egypt, under CIA direction, for six months.  Interview with Mamdouh Habib
in Sydney, Austl. (Dec. 30, 2011).  His wife, Maha Habib, had no idea where he was for
much of that time. Interview with Maha Habib in Sydney, Austl. (Jan. 5, 2012).  All three
men were brought to Guantanamo after their torments in the CIA program. See PETER JAN
HONIGSBERG, supra note 18 (describing and analyzing the CIA’s extraordinary rendition
program).
140. Memorandum from Dep’t of Defense to the Commander of the Joint Task
Force 170 (Oct. 11, 2002).
141. Many detainees were held in isolation for longer than 30 days.  In fact, two
detainees interviewed by W2G, Feroz Ali Abbasi and Moazzam Begg, were held for a year
or longer.
142. Clemente also indicated that David Becker, the head of the Department of
Homeland Security Human Intelligence Services (Humint), was also involved in develop-
ing the interrogation plans described in Phifer’s memo.
143. Memorandum from Dep’t of Defense to the Commander of the United States
Southern Command (October 11, 2002).
144. Memorandum from Dep’t of Defense to the Commander of the Joint Task
Force 170 (October 11, 2002).
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endorse these techniques.  That is, although she did not find that these
techniques violated federal law or the constitution, she asked for affir-
mation by military personnel higher up the chain of command.
In a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Wil-
liam Haynes, General Counsel to the DoD, recommended that Rum-
sfeld approve Categories I and II and only the mild physical contact
procedure in Category III.145  He indicated that although “all Category
III techniques may be legally available,” the other Category III tech-
niques should not be adopted at that time.  At the bottom of the memo-
randum, date-stamped December 2, 2002, Rumsfeld scribbled,
“However, I stand for 8-10 hours a day.  Why is standing limited to 4
hours?”146
In her legal analysis supporting the inhumane treatment of the
detainees, Beaver considered and weighted the effect of the world’s
leading humanitarian and human rights treaties: the Geneva Conven-
tions (GC), the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  All three documents
were signed and ratified by the United States.
Beaver determined that because the detainees were not prisoners
of war but were “enemy combatants,”147 the GC did not apply to them.
She also decided that CAT and the ICCPR only bound the U.S. to the
standard articulated by the 8th Amendment’s prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment, and not to any higher standards.  She con-
cluded her analysis by deducing that the interrogators could not be in
violation of the 8th Amendment standard because they acted in “good
faith” and that there was a legitimate governmental interest and objec-
tive in obtaining the information.  She also noted that the interrogators
were also excused because they had no specific intent to cause harm.
Although she was a Judge Advocate General (JAG) lawyer, Lt.Col,
Beaver was neither an expert in international law nor likely an expert in
the rules of interrogation under American law.  She should have not
been assigned to draft the memorandum on the treatment of detainees,
and certainly not to be the sole signatory to the memorandum.  How-
ever, because the military assigned the task of drafting this memoran-
dum to her, the military’s chain of command should have been
earnestly involved in reviewing and vetting her work.  She, herself, was
aware of her limited knowledge and expertise in these areas, as indi-
cated by her request that the harsher methods suggested in Phifer’s
145. Memorandum from Dep’t of Defense to the Secretary of Defense (Nov. 27,
2002).
146. Id.
147. For an analysis of the term enemy combatants and how the administration
used it to circumvent the GC, see Peter Jan Honigsberg, Chasing ‘Enemy Combatants’ and
Circumventing International Law: A License for Sanctioned Abuse, 12 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR-
EIGN AFF. 1, (2007).
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memorandum “undergo a legal review prior to their commence-
ment.”148
Nevertheless, either no one in the chain of command seriously
reviewed her work or, if someone did review her analysis, no other mili-
tary official acknowledged accountability by signing the memorandum.
The military left her to defend her position alone.  Because her signa-
ture was the only one on the memorandum, civil libertarians, interna-
tional and constitutional law scholars, and human rights advocates
pointed to her as the person who provided legal cover for the inhu-
mane interrogation techniques in Guantanamo.
In her public statements, she seems to waver between defending
her actions and apologizing if she was mistaken.  In later years, Beaver
claimed surprise that her memorandum was accepted as is.149  She
maintained before the Senate Armed Services Committee that the tac-
tics she had authorized would not have been unlawful if the approval
and control procedures had been followed.150  She also defended her
position by testifying that, “under great stress and danger I tried to do
everything in my lawful power to protect the American people.”151
On August 1, 2002, two months before Beaver wrote her memoran-
dum, John Yoo, Assistant Attorney General, and Jay Bybee, his supervi-
sor in the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), in the Department of Justice,
issued what have been described as several “Torture Memos.”  One tor-
ture memoradum indicated that before tactics could rise to the level of
torture, “[t]he victim must experience intense pain or suffering of the
kind that is equivalent to the pain that would be associated with serious
physical injury so severe that death, organ failure or permanent damage
resulting in loss of significant body function will likely result.”152  Yoo
and Bybee’s definition of torture was exceedingly narrow when com-
pared to the definition of torture found in the internationally recog-
nized “Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment” (CAT).153  Under CAT, “torture
means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession . . .
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
148. Memorandum from Dep’t of Defense to Commander of the Joint Task Force
170 (Oct. 11, 2002).
149. Diane E. Beaver, Lieutenant Colonel, Remarks before the U.S. Armed Services
Committee (June 18, 2008), at 2.
150. Id. at 3.
151. Id.  One might have the impression that Beaver was made to take the blame
because she was a low-ranking woman in the military’s high-testosterone male culture.
However, if she saw herself as a victim in that environment, she may also have had to view
herself with diminished status and independence as a military lawyer.  Consequently, she
has never publicly stated that she was used by the administration to take the fall.
152. Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel to Alberto
R. Gonzales (Aug. 1, 2002), at 13.
153. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment (1994), http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cat.html.  The U.S. is a signa-
tory of CAT.  However, the U.S. reserved the right to define CIDT differently.
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with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity.”154
Another Yoo and Bybee memorandum reviewed and sanctioned
ten torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading techniques for a particu-
lar captured “high-level” detainee named Abu Zabaydah.155  The ten
techniques were attention grasp; walling, i.e., pushing detainee into
flexible wall; facial hold; facial slap; cramped confinement in a con-
fined space or container; wall standing, where he is 4–5 feet from the
wall, his arms stretched out and his fingers resting on the wall; stress
positions, such as kneeling on the floor while leaning back at a 45
degree angle; sleep deprivation; insects placed in a confinement box;
and waterboarding.156  A number of other OLC memos also approving
inhumane techniques were drafted and used over the next two years.157
The OLC provides legal counsel to the president.  Its role is to pro-
vide objective analyses of the law.  With the appropriate legal informa-
tion, the president can then make an informed decision.  However, Yoo
and Bybee politicized the office.  Their memoranda were not objective.
Rather, the memoranda were designed to condone and endorse illegal
and inhumane interrogation techniques undertaken by the CIA and
the military.
Although Beaver did not link her memo to the torture memo-
randa, the August 1st torture memo seemed to set the groundwork for
Beaver’s memo.  Her memo mirrors the conceit of the OLC memo in
justifying coercive interrogation techniques.  It is unimaginable that
either Beaver did not see at least one of these OLC memos, or that
someone did not tell her of the analysis and outcome of the OLC’s
memos before she drafted her own memo.
In approving the techniques, Yoo and Bybee protected govern-
ment officials and interrogators from any consequences of their behav-
ior.  Those who advocated rapport-based approaches, or who opposed
or even voiced doubts about the use of harsh interrogations including
torture and CIDT, were marginalized from the seats of power and deci-
sion-making.158
154. Id. at Part I, art. 1.1.
155. Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel to John
Rizzo 13 (Aug. 1, 2002).
156. Id. at 2–3.
157. OLC FOIA Electronic Reading Room, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice
.gov/olc/olc-foia1.htm.
158. Two examples of people with high-ranking positions who were marginalized
were Alberto Mora, General Counsel of the Navy, and William Howard Taft IV, Chief
Legal Advisor to the Department of State.  When Mora reported to General Counsel for
the Department of Defense, Jim Haynes, that interrogators in Guantanamo were con-
ducting unlawful interrogation techniques, Haynes assured Mora that he would instruct
the military to eliminate any unlawful methods.  However, instead of instructing the mili-
tary to terminate the abuse, Haynes, at Secretary Rumsfeld’s order, permitted and even
encouraged the abuse to continue. Interview with Alberto Mora in Wash., D.C. (Dec, 4,
2010).  In addition, from then on, Haynes excluded Mora from all high-level policy meet-
ings. Interview with Alberto Mora in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 4, 2010) (Mora’s story is recounted
in more detail in Part II, supra).  Similarly, after Taft wrote a memo arguing that the
detainees brought to Guantanamo should be guaranteed the protections of the Geneva
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PART II. EXAMPLES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT “RAPPORT BUILDING”
INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES AND APPROACHES FROM FALL
2002 TO EARLY 2004 (AS TOLD THROUGH THE
VOICES OF INTERROGATORS)
Unlike the harsh interrogation practices and policies condoned by
high-ranking military officials described in Part I, law enforcement
agencies, as well as certain individual military interrogators, followed
the rapport-based approach when interrogating detainees.  As
explained in Part I, law enforcement and the military had, what
appeared to be, competing goals.  The military wanted to gather intelli-
gence at any cost, even if it meant conducting coercive interrogations.
Law enforcement would not rely on evidence that was derived from
abusive interrogations and sought untainted evidence that could be
used in prosecutions.
This Part will look at the approaches, techniques, and impact of
two Guantanamo interrogators who pursued rapport-building tech-
niques.  Torin Nelson worked in 2002, Jennifer Bryson in 2004 and
2005.  This Part will also review the efforts of Jim Clemente, an FBI
agent who traveled to Guantanamo in fall 2002 to assist in training
interrogators.  Although Clemente believed he would succeed in con-
vincing the military of the value of a rapport-based approach, his labors
were largely futile.159  All three spoke with W2G about their work.
A. Jim Clemente, FBI Agent
From 1998 to 2009, Jim Clemente worked as a profiler in the FBI’s
Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU), in Quantico, Virginia.  His focus was
on sex crimes and sexual offender behavior.  As he explained, the FBI’s
profiling approach is analogous to the “reverse engineering of a
crime.”160  He described it this way:
We look at the behavioral evidence at that crime scene and then we
work backwards towards the kind of person who committed this particu-
lar crime.  And what it does is it narrows down the field of suspects and
helps police officers focus their investigation so they can resolve crimes
a lot faster.161
Clemente also taught interviewing and interrogation skills at the
FBI’s National Academy.  Interrogation is “the most dynamic form of
profiling,” he told W2G.162  The more the person talks, the more the
agency will learn about the person.  The interrogator is constantly shift-
ing gears as he or she reads the words and body language, as well as the
Conventions, he became marginalized.  The administration excluded him from receiving
important documents and reports addressing international law issues, including the
famed “Torture Memos” written by John Yoo, for review. Interview with William Howard
Taft, IV in S.F., Cal. (Nov. 13, 2012).
159. His observations and experiences are supported by several other government
officials also interviewed by W2G and mentioned in this Part.
160. Interview with Jim Clemente in S.F., Cal. (June 13, 2013).
161. Id.
162. Id.
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personality,163 of the detainee.  That is, the essence of interrogation is
“human interaction.”164
Clemente also emphasized the FBI’s core value of “rigorous obedi-
ence to the constitution.”165  “I don’t care who he was or what he did or
didn’t do.  We have a mandate to uphold the Constitution and that’s
what we had to do,”166 he emphasized.
In fall 2002, the military invited unit chiefs from the BAU to fly to
Guantanamo and analyze the military’s interview and interrogation pro-
gram.  The military wanted to adopt new interrogation tactics to obtain
the intelligence they believed the detainees were concealing from their
interrogators.
As a behavioral expert, Clemente flew down to Guantanamo in
mid-October, staying for nearly two months, until early December.  As a
behavioral analysis expert, Clemente planned to study the body lan-
guage of detainees.  He also planned to conduct interviews for military
interrogators to observe.  Clemente, reflecting the FBI’s core approach
to interrogation, believed that rapport-building techniques would work
best for detainees who resisted.167
Clemente gave an example to W2G on the rapport-based approach
he used on one detainee.  When he arrived in Guantanamo, he was
introduced to an uncooperative detainee who “was doing nothing but
sitting mute during interrogations or reciting the Koran from mem-
ory.”168  Clemente believed that the man was uncooperative because
the military was using the “fear up” and “anxiety up,” harsh interroga-
tion approaches, where “you reinforce that belief that we’re the devil,
that we’re evil.”169  This approach was counterproductive because “you
help them do what they’re doing, resisting you . . . .  Instead, you want
them to work with you, not against you.”170
163. Id.
164. Id. Bowman also confirmed what Clemente had said about the BAU.  He
explained how the BAU “tries to figure out how best to do an interrogation for a particu-
lar person.”  The FBI learns “about an individual’s background, what his likes and dislikes
were, what his family was like, who he grew up with, does he like sports, what food does he
like, everything, and try to develop a line of questioning for agents to better elicit cooper-
ation from a person.”  Bowman also described it as a rapport-building activity. Interview
with Marion Bowman in Wash. D.C. (Mar. 10, 2011).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. A BAU memorandum dated May 5, 2003, and directed to Marion Bowman,
Senior Counsel for National Security Affairs, and two others, confirmed Clemente’s state-
ment that the FBI was sent to Guantanamo to train the military interrogators in more
effective and less harsh interrogation methods.  The memo indicated that the FBI was
available at Guantanamo to: assist agents conducting interviews and provide training to
FBI/CITF personnel.  Of particular importance were a series of successful interviews
which SSA conducted with [known as detainee] who had stopped talking to interrogators.
“Utilizing interviewing techniques taught by the BAU, SSA was gradually able to re-estab-
lish a dialogue . . . which ultimately led to the detainee’s renewed cooperation.”  Memo-
randum from the Critical Incident Response Group and Behavioral Analysis Unit to the
Counterterrorism General Counsel 5 (May 30, 2003).
168. Interview with Jim Clemente in S.F., Cal. (June 13, 2013).
169. Id.
170. Id.
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Clemente met with the detainee.  He began by saying that he did
not care what the detainee had done.  Rather, Clemente told the
detainee that he was meeting with him to learn about his culture and
religion.  According to Clemente, because this particular detainee had
an engineering degree and was an educated man, he was smarter, per-
haps, than anyone else in the camp.  The two men started talking, com-
paring Christianity with Islam.  Over a 21-day period, they bonded and
the detainee became “extremely cooperative.”171
The problem, as Clemente saw it, was that the military neither
understood how to interview nor how to analyze what it was hearing.
Clemente believed that in its abusive interrogation process, the military
hardened the people against us.  Clemente explained to the military
that Guantanamo was not on the battlefield.  That is, in Guantanamo
the military was not waging a war, but running a prison.  As Clemente
understood the law, because the detainees were in American custody,
they had the right to be treated like anyone else in U.S. custody.
Clemente also told W2G of another slapdash military interrogation
tactic where the interrogator would duct tape a detainee’s mouth shut
for four hours, and “bombard” him with questions during the full four
hours.172  The military assumed that when they tore off the tape, the
detainee would blurt out secrets.
Clemente explained that this tactic of duct-taping a detainee was
another example of the military being completely misguided, if not
senseless, in its approach to interrogation.  He added that he believed
the military was “unsupervised by anyone who had any kind of
morals.”173  Similarly, although Clemente did not witness waterboard-
ing while in Guantanamo, he acknowledged that military officials
“spoke of it as if it was a completely accepted practice there,”174 and
that it was in the plan for detainee 063, Mohammed al Qahtani.175
To Clemente, the methodologies used by the FBI and the military
collided:
You have the U.S. military, who in the middle of the military
action has apparent standards that are vastly different than what
our standards are in the FBI.  And now you’ve put them both
together in a situation where those standards are in conflict, direct
conflict with each other.  And I think that was the basis of the
problem.  It was bound to happen.176
Clemente emphasized to W2G that by treating the detainees coer-
cively, the military could have “ruined”177 the cases that the govern-
ment would have wanted to prosecute in court.  Any evidence obtained
by harsh mistreatment would likely be inadmissible at a trial.  Moreover,
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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he noted, “I’m not aware of any successes [of the military] in obtaining
actionable intelligence, and the whole reason we were there was
because they were failing.”178
Before he arrived in Guantanamo, Clemente had thought that he
would be “sitting down with reasonable [military] people who actually
wanted to get the most unbiased and accurate information from these
people.”179  Instead he was “exposed . . . [to] sadistic people who took
advantage of the situation.”180
Clemente repeatedly stressed the importance of treating the
detainees humanely, especially because they were powerless.  “You have
to be a sadist to be able to hurt somebody who is completely helpless,”
he said.  “And not only that, but it’s counterproductive to our mission.
Our mission is to get these people to give us the information that they
have in order to protect our country and help prosecute people that
are, you know, committing crimes against the country.”181
While in Guantanamo, Clemente met with Diane Beaver, who had
written the memo approving the Counter-Resistance Strategies
described in Part I.  She had given him a copy of the memoranum.  He
told W2G that he “was aghast.  I could not believe what I had read
there.”182  He pointed out that federal law, particularly the “torture stat-
ute,”183 prohibited these tactics.  According to Clemente, Beaver
replied that since the goal of the tactics was not to cause serious physi-
cal or mental injury or death, but to get information, the statute did not
apply.184  She added, ‘“The general believes me and not you.’”185
Clemente also told W2G that, “she said that when they [the mili-
tary] ran out of ideas they were actually watching the show 24 to get
ideas on what to do with the detainees.”186  In this widely-popular televi-
sion show that began in November 2001, the plot lines focused on the
hero thwarting terrorist attacks, assassinations, and use of weapons of
mass destruction with harsh interrogation techniques.  The show’s pow-
erful message was that saving American lives justified harsh, cruel, and
inhumane treatment.
Clemente also met with LTC Jerald Phifer, who had set out the
Counter-Resistance Strategies in his memorandum to Major General
Michael Dunlavey.  Clemente explained to Phifer that he would not
sign off on the harsh interrogation Counter-Resistance Strategies.
According to Clemente, Phifer had already told people that other
agents of the FBI had signed off on Phifer’s interrogation plan.187  Cle-
mente assured him that the FBI would never sanction such tactics.  Cle-
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 18 U.S.C. §§2340–2340A (2001).
184. Interview with Jim Clemente, supra note 160.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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mente added that after his meetings with Phifer, he decided to
document his experiences and observations in Guantanamo, thinking
that he was not certain “how high up people knew of what was going on
down here.”188
Marion (Spike) Bowman held a position as Senior Executive Ser-
vice in the FBI in Washington, D.C. after 9/11.  As senior lawyer, he was
responsible for providing legal advice for all national security investiga-
tions, espionage, industrial espionage, terrorism, weapons of mass
destruction, as well as some of the fledgling cyber issues at that time.
When he spoke to W2G, Bowman confirmed that FBI behavioral scien-
tists were sent down to Guantanamo in November 2002 to help estab-
lish a protocol for doing interrogations that the FBI had found
successful.
However, confirming the attitude that Clemente discovered when
dealing with the military in Guantanamo, Bowman explained how the
FBI was “basically told to go pound sand.”  That is, the military told
them that this “is not an FBI thing.  It’s a military thing and we’ll do it
our way.”189  When Bowman contacted the DoD’s Principal Deputy
General Counsel Daniel Dell’Orto to question the military’s approach,
Dell’Orto said he would inquire into it.  However, “nothing
happened.”190
Bowman then contacted Pentagon General Counsel Jim Haynes,
Dell’Orto’s supervisor.  Haynes dismissed the concern, saying that
Dell’Orto was handling the issues.  Bowman knew that Haynes was lying
and was “flabbergasted.”  In speaking of himself and a handful of senior
military officers who manage rules of engagement and law of armed
conflict training throughout the DoD, “[e]verything we had been teach-
ing for so very long was just being tossed out the window, just virtually
overnight.  And all of us were simply stunned that this could go on
because each one of us, in our own sphere of influence, who was really
quite influential didn’t do any good.”191
Bowman also acknowledged to W2G that the FBI observed mis-
treatment at the detention center.  He believed that what the military
was doing was “dysfunctional,” and that there was a “better way to get
[actionable intelligence].”192  Throughout his W2G interview, Bowman
made it clear that the FBI would not “go to the dark side,” but rather
“stay with the rules that you’d been taught.”193  He added that, similar
to Clemente’s visit, he too went to Guantanamo to advise interrogators
tied to various agencies about proper interrogation techniques and the
rights of people who are captured.
Bowman faults the military for making a “fundamental change in
the role of the interrogator,”194 and in training the military interro-
188. Id.
189. Interview with Marion Bowman in Wash., D.C. (Mar. 10, 2011).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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gators in the SERE program and adopting SERE techniques in interro-
gations.  Bowman noted, “[t]he purpose of SERE school is not to elicit
information.  It’s to resist information.”195  “You don’t take that kind of
mistreatment and try to elicit information out of it.”196  It is just “funda-
mentally flawed.”197
However, although some military interrogators were, according to
Bowman, “relieved” and “grateful” for the FBI guidance, Bowman’s and
Clemente’s trips to Guantanamo had little effect.  Soon after Bowman’s
visit, the DoD issued to the interrogators “specific marching orders.”198
Bowman repeatedly stressed that FBI and NCIS objections made no dif-
ference, and the fact that the FBI had had decades of training was
“ignored.”
The irony of the FBI’s influence and effect in those early days of
Guantanamo is reflected in the May 5th, 2003 BAU memorandum.  The
BAU author wrote of several examples where military personnel have
awaited the departure of an FBI supervisor “before embarking on
aggressive, unilateral interrogation which they knew would not have
been endorsed by the FBI.”199
Mark Fallon, who on 9/11 was Chief of Counter Intelligence Oper-
ations for the Europe, Africa, and Middle East Division of the NCIS,200
reaffirmed Clemente’s approach to interrogation and the conflicting
issues with military interrogations.  When interrogations began in
Guantanamo, Fallon became the deputy commander of the DoD’s
Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF), composed of representatives
from the military’s criminal investigative organizations.  CITF’s interro-
gations were rapport-based.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Bowman had comments on several of the men in power, whom he had known.
He thought that John Yoo, who worked across the street from him, and who drafted the
torture memos, “believed in what he was writing.”  Bowman understood that the harsh
interrogation issues were made known to Attorney General Ashcroft, although he does
not know how Ashcroft responded.  He believed that David Addington, Cheney’s Legal
Counsel in 2001–2005 and then became Cheney’s Chief of Staff, was “heavily involved” in
Guantanamo issues and that with Cheney, they were the “driving forces behind the poli-
cies.”  He also believed that White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales was “way over his
head,” in understanding and dealing with the issues.  And Bowman had “very little
respect” for Rumsfeld.  Bowman believed that Rumsfeld did not try to find solutions to
contemporary problems, but ignored them.  Bowman told W2G that when Cheney was
Secretary of Defense in the elder Bush’s administration, he was “very kind, jovial, focused”
and “personable.”  However, when he became vice president, “he was an entirely different
personality.”  He was “driven in ways that I’d never seen as Secretary of Defense.” Id.  This
remark is similar to that made by Col. Lawrence Wilkerson who described Cheney as
power hungry.  Wilkerson indicated that when Cheney was hired as chair of the search
committee to find a vice president, Cheney intended all along to become the VP on his
own.  “He picked himself,” Wilkerson said of Cheney. Interview with Lawrence Wilkerson
in Wash., D.C. (Mar. 9, 2011).
198. Interview with Marion Bowman in Wash., D.C. (Mar. 10, 2011).
199. Memorandum from Critical Incident Response Grp. (CIRG) & Behavioral
Analysis Unit to Raymond May and Marion Bowman (May 30, 2003).
200. David Brant, Director of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) con-
firmed to W2G that the NCIS also believes in rapport-based interrogations. Interview with
David Brant, supra note 17.
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Fallon explained to W2G that the humane treatment of a detainee,
as undertaken by the CITF at Guantanamo, was nearly no different
from the interrogation of any other person in the U.S. prison system,
with two exceptions: detainees in Guantanamo were not read their
Miranda rights and did not have the right to an attorney present at
questioning.201
Fallon added that, “You can’t make somebody talk.  There is no
truth serum . . . .  It’s developing rapport.”  He also seconded Cle-
mente’s belief that military interrogation tactics prevented the military
from obtaining actionable intelligence.202  He too became frustrated
with the changes that the military adopted in conducting interroga-
tions.  In fact, Fallon was the person who initiated the chain reaction of
protests, led by General Counsel of the Navy Alberto Mora that went all
the way up to the desk of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
As documented below, efforts by Mora and others to inform the
upper reaches of government and the military of the dangers of pursu-
ing a harsh interrogation program were, ultimately, futile.  Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld and Pentagon lawyer Jim Haynes actively ignored the
complaints and refused to put a brake on CIDT and torture at Guanta-
namo.  The problem, it turned out, was systemic.
Alberto Mora was one of the highest-ranked civilians in the DoD
who had tried to do the right thing and put an end to the torture at
Guantanamo.  Instead, he was misled and even lied to by people in the
highest echelons of the administration.
As Mora explained to W2G, in December 2002 David Brant, the
director of the NCIS informed Mora that interrogations in Guanta-
namo were not conducted according to the Army Field Manual.  Brant
had heard this from Mark Fallon.203  Then, Brant, along with Dr.
Michael Gelles, a senior psychologist, met with Mora.  They disclosed
that they had reliable information indicating that abusive interroga-
tions were occurring in Guantanamo, and that interrogations could
continue to deteriorate under the theory of “force creep.”204  That the-
ory, according to Mora, was that because the interrogators were
untrained, undisciplined, and possibly authorized, the abuse could get
much worse and could reach levels of torture.205
Mora sought out General Counsel of the Army, Steve Morellofor
further verification.  Morello showed him the memos by Phifer,
201. Of course, civil liberties advocates would argue that these two exceptions are
quintessential under American law.
202. Interview with Mark Fallon in S.F., Cal. (Oct. 25, 2013).
203. Both Brant and Fallon confirmed this in their interviews with W2G. Interview
with David Brant in Wash., D.C. (Mar. 11, 2011); Interview with Mark Fallon in S.F., Cal.
(Oct. 25, 2013).  Fallon told W2G that it was with al Qahtani that the interrogators
“started going down a road . . . that I felt was illegal.” Interview with Mark Fallon in S.F.,
Cal, (Oct. 25, 2013).  It was then that Fallon decided to stand up and speak out against
what was happening in Guantanamo. Interview with Mark Fallon in S.F., Cal. (Oct. 25,
2013).
204. Interview with Alberto Mora in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 4, 2010).  According to
Mora, force creep is in the psychological literature of interrogation.
205. Id.
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Dunlavey, and Beaver.  Mora had not been aware of the existence of the
memoranda.  Mora also noticed Rumsfeld’s handwritten comment that
because he stands for eight hours a day, why is it a problem for a
detainee to be required to stand for four hours?206  Mora saw these
memos and the direction in which they were going as a legal, political,
and policy “disaster.”  He decided to make an appointment with Jim
Haynes, the chief Pentagon lawyer.207
When they met, Mora spent nearly the entire meeting laying out
arguments as to why these techniques should not be implemented, and
that the techniques violated constitutional standards and American val-
ues.  He called Beaver’s memorandum “incompetent” and that her con-
clusions were “all wrong.”208  Haynes said very little, other than that the
techniques in the documents were not torture.209  When he left
Haynes’ office, Mora believed that Haynes would phone Rumsfeld and
inform him that Rumsfeld and he (Haynes) had made a mistake in
approving them.210  That next day, an optimistic Mora “was absolutely
confident that this was resolved.”211  He expressed to W2G, “[a]ctually I
thought, you know, this is the best work I’ve ever done as a lawyer, best
work I’ve ever done in government.  This is the greatest service I’ve ever
rendered for my country.”212
Mora asked Gelles to write a comprehensive memo explaining that,
in the literature, relationship based interrogations, where one builds
trust, were the gold standard.  The memorandum’s conclusion was well
supported.  The memorandum was submitted to the working group,
but had little effect.  As Mora described it, people were compelled, as
working groups often are, to assume various positions “channeling
them back into the same old Guantanamo projections.”213
To compound the problem for Mora, and help entrench a harsh
interrogation policy in Guantanamo, someone asked the Office of
Legal Counsel to submit a memorandum to the task force.  The memo-
randum was by John Yoo, and it was one of his torture memoranda.
Mora had not heard of Yoo at that time.  However, when he read the
memorandum, he was appalled by the standards and levels of cruelty
and torture justified by the memorandum.  He told Walker that the
memorandum was terribly reasoned and not good law.  She disagreed
with him.  She added that Haynes also thought that it was good analysis
and good law.214
If the Yoo memo were applied to the working group, the working
group would have to accept the Yoo analysis as its foundation, Mora
explained to W2G.  The consequence of incorporating Yoo’s memoran-
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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dum would allow all “that Rumsfeld had authorized in Guantanamo be
reauthorized again under the pretense of a greater authority.”215
Mora contacted Haynes and emphasized that the Yoo memo was
wrong on the law and in its analysis, and that the working group should
not adopt it.  Mora heard no more about the task force memo after
that.  A final draft of the task force’s work was never circulated, and the
working group was disbanded.  Mora, consequently and to his short-
term relief, believed that Haynes never finalized the task force docu-
ment, a document that would have relied on Yoo’s memorandum.216
However, months later Mora learned that although Haynes had
never sought final approval of the document from the task force, the
document had been formally approved by the Office of the Secretary.
On his own authority, Haynes had signed out the report.  As Mora tells
it, Haynes had taken the document out of the working group process,
authorized the document and kept his actions and the document hid-
den from the military services except for Mary Walker.  The document
was then circulated into the military channels.217
In looking back at those early days today, one can see that Cle-
mente, Bowman, Fallon, Brant and, of course, Mora, were well-inten-
tioned but, perhaps, too optimistic in expecting that the leaders of our
government would do the right thing when errors were revealed.  Mora
and the others had grown up in a world where American values meant
something, where other nations and peoples looked to us for leader-
ship on the rule of law and human rights.  However, the Cheney-Rum-
sfeld train had pulled out of the station before any of the protesting
men and women arrived on the platform.
B. Torin Nelson, Guantanamo Interrogator in 2002
As former Guantanamo interrogator Torin Nelson saw it, interro-
gation for purposes of intelligence gathering is “not just a necessary evil
in my opinion.  It’s a good thing but it can be used for bad like a gun.
They could be used to enforce the law or to break the law.”
Torin Nelson was well-trained as a military interrogator before 9/
11.  He began his career in 1992.  However, he and the other interro-
gators in those years were trained in cold war interrogation tactics.  He
knew five languages including Russian.  As he told W2G, “I was a for-
eign Soviet Union Eastern European specialist . . . .  When 9/11
occurred, I was re-stamped as counter terrorism, counter extremist Mid-
dle East Central Asian Expert.”218  Even the best trained were not
trained in the culture of the Middle East, much less in learning about
the Taliban.  When 9/11 happened, interrogators were unprepared for
interrogating al Qaeda or Taliban.  Nelson prepared himself after 9/11
by reading a book on the Taliban.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Interview with Torin Nelson in S.F. Cal. (June 5, 2014).
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According to Nelson, there were only 1200 interrogators before 9/
11.219  There was no need for more during the Cold War.  Then, after
9/11, the military increased the number tenfold over the decade,
adding approximately 3000 interrogators per year from the U.S. Army
Intelligence Center.220  The problem, as Nelson understood it, was that
the new interrogators were not well trained, but rather were rushed
into duty.  The need was great, and quality control was not a primary
concern.  Damien Corsetti presented a similar observation when he
described the minimum training he received before becoming an inter-
rogator in Bagram.221
When Nelson arrived in Guantanamo, they put him into an inter-
rogation unit without any training or background on the people he
would be interrogating.222  Although he had thought that with his back-
ground in Russian and eastern European culture, he would be one of
the least experienced interrogators, he turned out to be one of the
most experienced.  He was assigned to, as he explained it, the most
difficult detainees to interview, the Saudis and Yemenis.223
Nelson worked as a military interrogator in Guantanamo from July
2002 to February 2003.  He told W2G that unlike some of his colleagues
he adhered to the rapport-based approach.  However, Nelson was
required to interrogate 40 detainees per month,224 which would, seem-
ingly, limit his ability to establish a relationship with them.  Neverthe-
less, he told W2G that he believed he was successful in obtaining
relevant intelligence in his interrogations.  As he explained, his focus
was on military and insurgent capabilities, as well as on morale, method-
ologies, tactics and strategies.225
Detainees had told W2G that they would have to make all their
requests to their interrogators.  That is, the interrogators would control
their comfort items, their visits to the doctor or dentist, and other
requests that they made.226
Nelson explained to W2G that the military’s attitude toward gath-
ering intelligence was backwards in thinking.  That is, when other inter-
rogators in Guantanamo were not obtaining the intelligence that the
military expected, the military did not take a self-reflective look into its
own programs and examine whether the interrogators were doing their
jobs correctly and effectively.  Instead, the military placed the blame on
the detainees for holding out.  As Nelson described it, the leadership
did not look into what it would take to “become a better interrogator, it
was mostly, well what can we do to the detainees to get them to talk?”227
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See Part I.
222. Interview with Torin Nelson, supra note 218.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. E.g., “In Guantanamo, if you complained to the doctor, he would tell you, ‘Go
talk to the interrogator.  Answer the questions of the interrogator so that I can treat
you.’” Interview with Sami al Hajj in Casablanca, Morocco (July 13, 2012).
227. Interview with Torin Nelson, supra note 218.
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While in Guantanamo, Nelson was aware of the cruel and abusive
treatment that al Qahtani suffered.  It was hard not to be aware, he said.
It was such a small community, and the interrogators would gather
together and talk when they had down times.  However, according to
Nelson, it was not until General Geoffrey Miller arrived in Guantanamo
in November 2002 that the culture dramatically changed and all inter-
rogators were expected to use harsher methods to obtain intelli-
gence.228  He also believed that many of the newly hired, younger and
less experienced interrogators “may have been more susceptible to
coercive techniques.”229  When W2G asked Nelson whether he ever
thought of speaking out against any of the abuses occurring in Guanta-
namo, he replied, “[w]ell in that time period you basically kept quiet
about it, if you had any disagreements . . . [t]he attitude was . . . even at
the four star general level—was, f these guys, they’re all terrorists . . . .
I’m an E-5 ‘buck’ sergeant at the time . . . [and] had no voice at that
point.”230
As Nelson understood it, the officers who held middle-rankings
would listen to his concerns and suggestions for improvement, and
often agree with him.  However, they too had no real authority.  The
senior leaders would not care to listen to him.  To Nelson, they were
both “ignorant and arrogant.”
Nelson believed that a significant portion of the detainees should
not have been held in Guantanamo.  They were not a threat to the U.S
and should have been released soon after they had arrived in Guanta-
namo, or “should never been sent to Gitmo to begin with.”231
C. Jennifer Bryson
In the spring of 2011 when Osama Bin Laden was killed, I watched
a resurgence in public support for cruelty and torture in interro-
gation, and the implication was that torture was what got us infor-
mation we needed for Bin Laden, and that therefore it was just
fine and it was something we needed to have for U.S. national
security.  And I was so repulsed and frightened and frustrated to
see this.  And especially those who were advocating this were not
interrogators.  They weren’t people who would actually know what
interrogation is.  And I also found it morally repulsive as a human
being and as an American.  And I finally realized that, to the
228. It was believed that Miller instituted harsh interrogation practices, including
CIDT and torture in interrogation techniques in Iraq, perhaps contributing, if not
directly causing, the notorious event of American soldiers torturing and brutalizing
detainees at Abu Ghraib prison.  Miller was targeted as the person who “Gitmoized” Iraq,
instituting the culture that caused Abu Ghraib. Interview with Janis Karpinski, FRONTLINE
(Aug. 5, 2005), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/interviews/karpin-
ski.html#3 (stating that Miller said he was going to “Gitmoize” the operations at Abu
Ghraib). See also THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 22, at 22, 40.
229. Interview with Torin Nelson, supra note 218.
230. Id.
231. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\31-1\NDE102.txt unknown Seq: 36 12-SEP-17 10:34
64 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 31
extent interrogators can  . . . speak publicly, I think interrogators
themselves need to be part of the public discussion.232
This statement is a rare declaration from an interrogator.  Few interro-
gators have agreed to speak to W2G, often out of fear of reprisals to
them and their families if they go public.  Jennifer Bryson has always
placed ethics and doing good over herself.  And in the fall of 2011, she
courageously went public, aware of the risks in being identified as an
interrogator.  As she explained to W2G, after 9/11 she wanted to do
something for her country, to defend her country, to “protect the coun-
try in my own small way that I could.”233  And she found the
opportunity.
Bryson had a very academic background.  She earned a BA from
Stanford University, an MA in medieval European intellectual history
from Yale University, where she also studied the history of philosophy,
and a PhD in Arabic and Islamic studies also from Yale, before she
became an interrogator.  After receiving her masters, she studied
Arabic in Egypt.
After earning her PhD, Bryson had difficulty finding rewarding
work where she would be “more engaged in the world” than in an aca-
demic environment.  The events of 9/11 changed her life.  She found
work with the DoD.  In 2003, she worked with the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), served on the Policy Staff of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, and worked at the U.S. embassies in Egypt and Yemen.  In
August 2003, while working with the DIA, an official suggested that
Bryson be trained as an interrogator for Guantanamo.  She began her
training in September.
The fact that Bryson underwent a rigorous training program based
on the Army Field Manual’s humane treatment standards in fall 2003
was in marked contrast to the minimal, if any, training the military pro-
vided interrogators in 2002, as described by both Damien Corsetti in
Part I and Torin Nelson above.234
At the time that Bryson began her training, there was no systematic
training program for civilians to become interrogators.  Instead, she was
slotted into a program for former military interrogators.  She was the
first “outsider.”  She told W2G that she found it interesting that they
chose her because of her education in cultural history, religion, and
language training, rather than someone who could, if necessary, be
brutal.
In February 2004, Bryson began her job as a DoD interrogator, and
was appointed as the first civilian and female235 team chief interrogator
232. Interview with Jennifer Bryson in S.F., Cal. (Dec. 21, 2011).
233. Id.
234. See supra Section II.2.
235. The fact that Bryson became the first female and civilian team chief was a huge
step for the military, but not one that went over well with every interrogator in Guanta-
namo.  One administrator in the training program said to her, “you’re a woman, they’re
not going to speak to you.  There’s no point in you getting this training.”  Bryson told
W2G, “[a]nd, indeed, he proved to be wrong.” Interview with Jennifer Bryson, supra note
232.  Mark Fallon told W2G that in the CITF, “some of our better interrogators were
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in Guantanamo.  The team chief’s responsibilities were to supervise a
team of interrogators and analysts that focused on a specific group of
detainees.236  Before she became team chief, the officers who were in
charge of the interrogation units were intelligence officers and not
trained interrogators.237  Similar to Nelson’s group of detainees, Bryson
was also assigned to the Saudis.
In explaining her training, Bryson emphasized how she learned to
both let go of her assumptions and become aware of her assumptions.
She added that “interrogators don’t just walk in and talk about
whatever they feel like asking about that day.”238  Rather, the intelli-
gence analysts determined the topics.  However, the interrogation was
never scripted and would constantly divert to new topics and issues as
necessary.  The team chief, in this case Bryson herself, would discuss
with each interrogator the detainee to be interviewed, the approaches
the interrogator planned to use, and the areas of inquiry.  Bryson
emphasized several times during her interview with W2G that the Army
Field Manual guided all interrogations in Guantanamo during her ten-
ure there.
As Bryson described it, the DoD returned to a more humane
approach in fall 2003 when she began her training.  In addition to pos-
sibly finding that over the past two plus years that the military’s harsh
interrogation techniques did not result in obtaining much, if any,
actionable intelligence, there are likely several other reasons why this
change occurred.  The war in Iraq had begun in spring 2003, and
unlike the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. had decided to abide by the
Geneva Conventions (GC) in Iraq.  Consequently, the captives were
treated as prisoners of war in Iraq, unlike the captives in Afghanistan
and Guantanamo who were deemed “enemy combatants,” a term used
by the administration to circumvent the GC.239  By applying the GC to
the Iraq War, the military intended to return to a humane interrogation
policy in Iraq.240  The DoD may have seen the need to return to a simi-
lar humane interrogation approach in Guantanamo.
There were other indicia indicating that times were changing.  The
United States Supreme Court announced on November 10, 2003, that it
would hear arguments in the case of Rasul v Bush.241 Rasul challenged
women.”  He continued, “some of our more effective elicitors, those who got us good
information just happen to be a woman.  And initially we thought that would not be the
case.” Interview with Mark Fallon, supra note 10.
236. Interview with Jennifer Bryson, supra note 232.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See Honigsberg, supra note 73; see also Peter Jan Honigsberg, The Real Origin of
the Term ‘Enemy Combatant’, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 9, 2014); http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/peter-jan-honigsberg/the-real-origin-of-the-te_b_4562216.html.
240. Abu Ghraib excepted, see infra text accompanying notes 225–226.
241. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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the Bush administration’s refusal to grant habeas hearings to the men
in Guantanamo.242
Although the Bush officials and lawyers must have thought that
they would prevail in the Supreme Court, there was always the fear that
they could lose.  And if they lost, lawyers would be permitted to fly to
Guantanamo to meet with the detainees and help prepare their cases.
Up until then, no lawyers were permitted to represent the detainees,243
except to represent the very few detainees selected to be tried in a mili-
tary tribunal.  Once lawyers would regularly travel to Guantanamo, the
government would no longer be able to interrogate the detainees with
impunity.  A lawyer would be watching.
In April 2004, while Bryson was in Guantanamo, photos of horrific
torture practices in the Iraqi Abu Ghraib prison were released.  And,
although the government argued that the torturers in Abu Ghraib were
rogue soldiers,244 the Senate Committee on Armed Services in its
report rejected that idea.  According to the report,
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s December 2, 2002
authorization of aggressive interrogation techniques and subse-
quent policies and plans approved by senior military and civilian
officials conveyed the message that physical pressures and degra-
dation were appropriate treatment for detainees in military cus-
tody.  What followed was an erosion in standards dictating that
detainees be treated humanely.245
Abu Ghraib may have again confirmed to the military the logic and
value in following the Army Field Manual.
In June 2004, the Supreme Court ruled in Rasul that the detainees
did have a right to file a habeas action in federal court.  Now lawyers
would regularly visit their clients in Guantanamo.  Thus, outside events
during 2003 and 2004 possibly informed the DoD’s policy of keeping
faith with the Field Manual.
Bryson explained that an interrogator did not make determina-
tions as to the value of the intelligence obtained.  That was the job of
the military analyst.  And, each analyst in Guantanamo worked in coor-
dination with a particular interrogator.  The interrogator’s job was to
obtain whatever she could and to write it down while interrogating.  She
noted that on television shows like 24, the viewer “never sees the inter-
rogators writing because writing might be boring.”246  Taking extensive
242. In a habeas hearing, the issue is not whether the detainee is innocent or guilty.
That issue is decided at trial.  Rather, the question is the legality of the detention.  Does
the jailor have the right to hold the prisoner?
243. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466 (granting detainees statutory rights to habeas).
244. See Rumsfeld visits Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison, CNN.COM (Mar. 4, 2005, 12:22 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/05/13/iraq.abuse/ (quoting Rumsfeld as
stating “there’s been a focus on a few who’ve betrayed our values . . . .”); George W. Bush,
President of the U.S., Remarks at the U.S. Army War College on Iraq and the War on
Terror (May 24, 2004) (calling Abu Ghraib “a symbol of disgraceful conduct by a few
American troops who dishonored our country and disregarded our values”).
245. The Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, supra note 16.
246. Interview with Jennifer Bryson, supra note 232.
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notes while interviewing seemed surprising.  Why not audiotape the
interrogations?  W2G asked her.
Bryson responded that there was no tradition of audiotaping in the
military.  The rationale was that the interrogator may be conducting
interrogations on the battlefield, where she would not have access to
technology.  Hence, note taking was a critical skill.  As Bryson explained
it, there was a difference between listening and hearing.  Because the
interrogator often had only one chance to talk to that person on the
battlefield, she needs to learn to record it carefully in writing.  Interro-
gators were trained to “maintain human connection and eye connec-
tion and take notes.”247
According to Bryson, Guantanamo interrogations were held in a
trailer, and each room had a two-way mirror.  In addition, someone
from the guard force would be in a central room to observe all the
interrogations—presumably for safety reasons in case the prisoner
became violent.  However, the observation would also, presumably,
guard against an interrogator who would otherwise exceed DoD guide-
lines.  According to Bryson, the audio was cut to the outside.  Conse-
quently, the analysts who watched from outside were dependent on the
interrogator’s written notes.  Bryson added that the DoD also shared
information with the FBI.
Early in her arrival, Bryson had an incident that contradicted what
she believed was true at that time––that the DoD had returned to a
rapport-based approach to interrogation.  Apparently, not all the inter-
rogators at Guantanamo were ready to adopt only rapport-based tech-
niques.  The following incident caused her to take charge quickly, and
assert her role as team chief.  As she tells it,
I had one interrogator, however, who was asking for permission
. . . to bring a detainee into a room that would be darkened with
strobe lights and extremely loud music.  That was, what one might
call, kind of, “head banger” music.
And I remember the request said the music will only be up to
such-and-such decibel and research has shown that this level, you
know, cannot harm the hearing . . . it was absolutely disturbed and
baffled and perplexed, because this had absolutely nothing to do
with how I had been trained.  This had absolutely nothing to do
with what the army had taught us was allowed . . . [a]nd it just
seemed wrong and I could not rationally imagine how this would
work.248  When I arrived, it was assumed that I would just say yes.
I don’t know how long this had been going on, and I can only
speak to my experience when I was there . . . . But when I said no I
said no and there was going to be no choice.
. . . And the interrogator who had been using this was having
zero success.  And my interrogators who were learning to really
247. Id.
248. Id.
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develop rapport-based interrogation, developing a human con-
nection with the detainee, were having success.249
To Bryson, the first step in interrogation is “preparation, prepara-
tion, preparation.”250  This includes background information about the
detainee, aspects of his personality, personal interests, and personal val-
ues.  The information is taken from intelligence reports, previous inter-
rogator notes, and analysts’ contributions.
Bryson also indicated that interrogation is extremely exhausting,
“it felt like somebody had put my brain in a blender on, you know,
crush.”251  Pacing oneself is critical here so that the interrogator goes
into the interrogation with a clear mind.
At the interrogation, food and drink mattered.  “Food was very,
very, very important for many of the interrogations,” she noted.252
Bryson always made it her habit to have tea present, using china cups,
and to share tea with the detainee.  According to Bryson, sometimes
detainees who were on hunger strikes would break their hunger strike
and eat during an interrogation.  They were assured that other detain-
ees with whom they wanted to be in allegiance and solidarity would not
know.
Bryson also considered her dress when interrogating.  Because she
worked with Saudis, she always dressed modestly and professionally.
She wore long sleeves and long skirts or long loose-fitting pants.  She
never wore a headscarf, because, as she explained, she was not Muslim.
She began each interrogation by greeting the detainee in Arabic
with As-Salamu Alaykum, peace be upon you.  She conducted her inter-
rogations in Arabic, her choice.  She noted their surprise to see a Cau-
casian blue-eyed woman speaking their language.  After the greeting,
she would check in on the detainee and ask whether he had any con-
cerns, to let him know that she was interested in him.  As she saw it, it
was basic common sense.  With a new detainee, she would take her time
to begin questioning.  During the first meeting, she would only
converse.
If the detainee did not want to talk, she would change topics and
tell stories.  She stressed the importance of stories.  She believed stories
provided a window to the humanity of each, as each spoke about and
reacted to the stories.  Her personal goal was always to build a founda-
tion, an individual relationship and a personal connection.  She empha-
sized that she would always treat the detainee with respect and that
harsh and adversarial attitudes did not work.
As she explained it, “[w]ithout trust, at least the tiniest amount of
trust, things didn’t work.”253  Again she reminded us that although
understanding body language or narrative discourse can be helpful, it is
up to the analysts to assess the validity of the information.  The interro-
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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gator’s role is to collect and record the information, even if something
“bizarre” is said.
She would sometimes play a role within a family context, such as
aunt, cousin, daughter or sister to the detainee.  The role depended on
the age of the detainee.  With one particular detainee, she let him assist
her with her Arabic.  If a detainee was particularly cooperative, she
might offer rewards such as watching a movie together, perhaps the
Disney film “Monsters Inc.”
Because she was a female and often in the room alone with the
detainee, the detainee would at minimum wear an ankle chain.  If the
detainee requested a bathroom break, she would leave the room and
guards would come in to unchain the detainee and take him to the
bathroom.
Unless the room was booked for a certain time, and someone else
was set to use it, she relied on intuition to terminate the interrogation.
For example, the detainee was worn out or tired.  She would also termi-
nate if necessary to maintain control of the session.  Similarly, if it was a
difficult session and all that could be done had been done for the day,
she ended it.  However, she noted that terminations needed to be han-
dled very carefully.  She would let the detainee know that if he had any
additional information, he should send her a message through the
guard force and she would meet him.  “You don’t just ask questions and
walk out of the room.  That simply is rude.  We would sort of close
down for the day, say farewell, and then close.”254
When we asked her about former detainees who had told W2G that
they were not able to obtain medical help, see a doctor or dentist, or
obtain comfort items without the approval of the interrogator, she
responded, “[t]his is not true.”255  She added that the interrogators had
no contact with the medical personnel and no access to medical
records.  Rather, the interrogator would have to speak to an army
officer to get to the medical team, if an issue arose such as whether the
detainee had food allergies.  And it was up to the medical team to deter-
mine what to do.  She added that interrogators were not permitted in
the medical facility, although they could visit a detainee in the cellb-
lock, under certain conditions.
She then told of a Saudi detainee, “somebody who had been
involved in planning an attack that you would have heard of . . . [a]nd
who was no fan of Americans.”  He said to her, “you know, I’ve noticed
that you Americans are providing medical care for all the detainees
including the ones who don’t talk.  You know, I have to admit that in
my country, I don’t think we would do that.  I respect you for this.”256
Although she would not talk about specific questions she had
asked, Bryson discussed some of the topics in which detainees were
254. Id.
255. Id. Cf. Torin Nelson’s remarks on this issue, supra Section II.2.  Bryson was not
clear as to whether the policy had changed by the time she arrived or whether it was only
her team that did not have this power over their detainees.
256. Interview with Jennifer Bryson, supra note 232.
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interested.  These included a detainee’s training to help predict poten-
tial types of attacks.
Bryson also expressed disappointment that the military, although
interested in how the men became attached to their ideology and vio-
lence in support of their ideology, was not even more interested in
these areas.  She believed that the military was still coming out of a
system based on the Cold War and the technicalities of a military situa-
tion.257  Yet, to her, these questions of how they became attached to
violent ideologies were of long-term significance.
She explained that when she first arrived, the previous interroga-
tion team was not having success with the Saudi detainees in gathering
intelligence.  She believed that prior to her arrival there was an environ-
ment of opposition to the detainees.  She noted that many of them
“would have been thrilled to kill us.”  Nevertheless, she believed that
the military did not have to take an oppositional posture to them, and
that there was a “tremendous human side to every single detainee.”258
She believed that the Saudis who were in Afghanistan in fall of
2001, “weren’t there growing pear trees.”259  Many of the younger
detainees “had gone there tremendously idealistic and committed” and
then became disillusioned over time.
Bryson noted that even in 2004, there was a great deal of intelli-
gence to gather.  She pointed out that information that was needed
changed over time.  For example, as high-level leaders were removed,
new leadership emerged.  The new leadership may have been people
who had trained with the detainees in the earlier years.  The detainees
may have known them personally, and in 2004 would have information
on these new leaders.
Bryson left Guantanamo in summer 2004, and underwent a second
training session.  At this session, she was educated in the Convention
Against Torture and on the Geneva Conventions.  Times had certainly
changed.  She returned to Guantanamo a few months later, and this
time her tour was for 18 months.
When we asked her specifically what motivated her to become
involved after 9/11, she eloquently explained,
[T]he reason I was doing it was because I thought we had a coun-
try worth protecting.  And I was deeply concerned and didn’t
understand the point of – I mean if you add cruelty and torture as
a systematic officially-approved part of what we do, it’s not a coun-
try I’d want to defend.  And it was also completely counter to the
training that I had.  It was completely counter to military interro-
gators I had taught and it was counter to my experience as an
interrogator.260
She added that the work was very meaningful and that “I experienced
interrogation as a non-violent way to prevent future violence . . . .  Every
257. Nelson also confirmed this in his interview. See supra Section II.2.
258. Interview with Jennifer Bryson, supra note 232.
259. Id.
260. Interview with Jennifer Bryson in S.F., Cal. (Dec. 21, 2011).
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single person, even people who want to kill us, is—individuals are
human.”261  Each of the detainees had his own individual story and
motivation as to why he was there.
Her wish was that from the early days of Guantanamo that the U.S.
would have had a program of what she called “de-and counter radical-
ization” for the detainees who were soon to go home.  She would have
liked to channel the human capacity of the detainees, recognizing their
intelligence, self-discipline, and hard work, into something positive.
Something that I emphasized to my interrogators, by which I
mean the interrogators I supervised from the beginning, is proba-
bly all these detainees at some point are going home.  And when
they’re home and they think American and if let’s say, an idea
comes up to attack an American hotel, they’re going to think of
you.  Leave with them an impression of a human being who has
treated them respectfully.262
PART III. SIX LONG-TERM UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE
MILITARY’S SHORT-TERM HARSH INTERROGATION TACTICS
Even though the harsh interrogation techniques occurred more
than a decade ago, their impact continues to harm America.  The fol-
lowing half-dozen long-term consequences have resulted from the mili-
tary’s short-term harsh interrogation tactics in Afghanistan and
Guantanamo, tactics that included torture and cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment:
1. The U.S. is constrained in prosecuting dangerous detainees
successfully, and accordingly, Guantanamo is still open.
2. America’s reputation at home and abroad has gravely suffered.
3. As the symbol of our violations of human rights and the rule of
law, Guantanamo has become a terrorist recruitment tool.
4. For young Americans, Guantanamo, torture and CIDT have
always existed and have become ingrained in our culture.
5. The harsh treatment motivated detainees to become violent,
and/or to turn their anger against the U.S., after their release.
6. Noncombatant personnel who worked with detainees and par-
ticipated in or observed mistreatment suffered PTSD.
A. Overarching Thoughts
As John Yoo, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Depart-
ment of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel explained,263 the administra-
tion selected Guantanamo, Cuba, because officials thought that the
U.S. Constitution did not apply in Guantanamo.  Under that theory,
261. Id.
262. Id.  After she left the DoD, Bryson became the Director of the Islam and Civil
Society Project at the Witherspoon Institute in Princeton, New Jersey.  She has also been a
visiting professor and guest instructor at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, PA, and
sits on the Board of Directors of Peach Catalyst International.
263. JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TER-
ROR 142–43 (2006).
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detainees would have not been able to file habeas petitions for the right
to a hearing before a federal judge.  To the administration in the early
years following the attacks on 9/11, Guantanamo was a place outside
the law.  And no one at the highest levels of the administration appar-
ently gave much, if any, thought to the long-term implications of
approving and even encouraging the military’s short-term unlawful and
abusive interrogation strategies.
The following six unintended consequences are identified and
briefly addressed.  However, these consequences are ongoing and con-
tinue their impact.  Accordingly, it is recommended that scholars pur-
sue the study of these consequences in detail, in the hope that future
generations will better understand the power of the consequences
when the U.S. violates its own law, as well as international law.  By fully
understanding the consequences, our future political leaders will, hope-
fully, make wiser choices consistent with human rights and the rule of
law.
B. Consequences
1. The U.S. is constrained in prosecuting dangerous detainees
successfully and, accordingly, Guantanamo is still open.
As described in Parts I and II, because the U.S. military cared only
about gathering intelligence to avert another attack, it did not concern
itself with whether the evidence it collected was admissible in a court of
law.  Consequently, the military hampered law enforcement’s goal to
gather evidence for prosecution of terrorists.  As Mark Fallon and
others have explained,264 the abusive interrogation of suspects caused
detainees to shut down and no longer talk, even after law enforcement
had established a rapport with them.
In addition, evidence obtained through torture and CIDT is pro-
hibited under law from use at a civil trial and even at military commis-
sions.  For example, the Pentagon dismissed the military commission
case against Qahtani because he had been tortured in Guantanamo.265
In another example, a federal court excluded statements made by
Binyam Mohamed, implicating Farhi Said Mohammed in terrorist activ-
ity, because Mohamed had been tortured in a black site in Morocco,
including having his penis sliced with a scalpel.266  After excluding
Binyam Mohamed’s statements, the court granted Farhi Said Moham-
med’s habeas petition.267
Because of the harsh interrogations conducted by the military,
rather than the rapport-based interrogations promoted and conducted
by federal law enforcement officials, the U.S. is unable to prosecute cer-
264. Interview with Mark Fallon, supra note 10.
265. William Glaberson, Case Against 9/11 Detainee Is Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES (May 14,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/14/washington/14gitmo.html.
266. Binyam Mohamed: the torture allegations, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 12, 2012), http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/9010123/Binyam-Mohamed-the-
torture-allegations.html.
267. Id.
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tain alleged terrorists.  Because the U.S. was afraid to release these men
and did not know what else to do with them, it continues to hold them
at Guantanamo.  Consequently, Guantanamo remains open today.  Had
we conducted humane interrogations, we would have obtained admissi-
ble evidence, allowing us to prosecute those who engaged in criminal
acts and release those who did not.268
Guantanamo has been open for more than fourteen years after the
first planeload of detainees arrived on January 11, 2002.  In addition,
more than seven years have passed since President Obama declared on
his second day in office that he would close Guantanamo within a
year.269
As of April 2016, the following numbers apply: eighty-nine men are
still living in Guantanamo, most without charges.270  They may live
there for the remainder of their lives.  Thirty-five of the men remaining
in Guantanamo have been cleared for release.271  Most of the men
cleared for release are from Yemen.272  Ever since the underwear
bomber tried to bring down the plane in Detroit on Christmas Day,273
Obama has refused to send any of the Yemeni detainees back to
Yemen,274 although several have been resettled in other countries.275
Forty-eight of the men have been designated for indefinite deten-
tion, which means that they may be held in Guantanamo until they
die.276  Twenty-three men may be charged with crimes and recom-
268. Under the Geneva Conventions, prisoners of war may be held until the end of
hostilities. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (“Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated with-
out delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”).  However, because the Bush Adminis-
tration did not apply the Geneva Conventions to the war on terror and to Guantanamo.
See Memorandum from George W. Bush, supra note 73 (noting that the rules in the GC
would not apply).
269. Mark Tran, Obama signs order to close Guantanamo Bay, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 22,
2009), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/22/hillary-clinton-diplomatic-for-
eign-policy.
270. Charlie Savage, 2 Libyan Guantanamo Inmates Are Transferred to Senegal, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/05/us/politics/guantanamo-
transfers.html?_r=0.
271. Id.
272. Cliff Sloan, The Path to Closing Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/01/06/opinion/the-path-to-closing-guantanamo.html.
273. Charlie Savage, Christmas Day Bomb Plot Detailed in Court Filings, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/11/us/underwear-bomb-plot-de
tailed-in-court-filings.html?_r=0; Paul Harris, ’Underwear bomber’, accused over Christmas Day
terror plot, goes on trial, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2011/oct/11/underwear-bomber-plot-trial-detriot.
274. Peter Finn, Return of Yemeni detainees at Guantanamo is suspended, WASH. POST
(Jan. 5, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/05/
AR2010010502850.html.
275. Sloan, supra note 272; Savage, supra note 273.
276. Adam Hudson, “Bush’s Fourth Term Continues”: Guantanamo, Torture, Secret Ren-
ditions; Indefinite Detention, TRUTHOUT (May 30, 2014), http://truth-out.org/news/item/
24030-bushs-fourth-term-continues-guantanamo-torture-secret-renditions-indefinite-deten
tion.
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mended for prosecution.277  The current Military Commissions’ prose-
cutions of the five men accused of orchestrating and participating in
the preparation of the attacks on 9/11, as well as the prosecution of the
man accused of the bombing of the USS Cole, have been moving so
slowly that it is unlikely that even one of the cases will begin, much less
end, before Obama leaves office in 2017.278
2. America’s reputation at home and abroad has gravely suffered.
Rushan Abbas was a translator for the Uyghurs, first working for
the government in Guantanamo and later for the lawyers representing
the Uyghurs.  She is an immigrant from East Turkestan, the home of
the Uyghurs.  East Turkestan was absorbed into China in the middle of
the last century.  In her interview with W2G, Abbas poignantly won-
dered, “[w]hat if our forefathers, they see, they know what’s happening
today in Guantanamo, how would they feel about this?”279  “[In] my 20
years in United States, I always want to see the great side of the United
States.  But the last 8 years, what I have endured, what I have exper-
ienced in Guantanamo was not the side that I want to see of my
country.”
By ignoring and circumventing the Constitution, we did not live up
to our own rules and principles.  American officials, in promoting tor-
ture and CIDT, betrayed our constitutional standards of due process
and fair treatment to all.  And these same officials did not inadvertently
betray our principles, but actively sought out a place that they believed
was outside the law.  To them, Guantanamo was a place where they
could disregard the Constitution with impunity.
In addition, by ignoring the Geneva Conventions, the Convention
Against Torture and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, America announced to the world that we would not play by uni-
versal rules, even when we sign international treaties that become part
of American law.  As a consequence, America’s reputation for justice
and fair treatment suffered not only at home, but also abroad.  America
lost its reputation as the world’s moral compass and foremost defender
of human rights and the rule of law.  Countries no longer look to the
U.S. as the model of decency and promoter of humane values.  Other
nations now feel that we have also given them permission to replicate
our shameful behavior in interrogating and treating their own
captives.280
To many people around the world, Guantanamo has become the
symbol of America’s violation of human rights and the rule of law.  That
is, whatever the extent of harsh interrogations, torture and CIDT that
277. Stacy Kaper, Half of the Prisoners at Gitmo Have Been Cleared for Release, NAT’L J.
(June 16, 2014), http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2014/06/how-close-guantanamo-
without-swapping-prisoners/86569/.
278. Jessica Schulberg et al., Most of the 9/11 Plotters Haven’t Been Convicted or Exe-
cuted. Blame Gitmo., HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 10, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/911-terrorists-guantanamo-military-commissions_us_57d308bce4b06a74c9f49858.
279. Interview with Rushan Abbas, Interpreter, in Palau, Micr. (Jan. 5, 2010).
280. Malinowski supra note 20; Cassin, supra note 20, at 447.
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occurred at Guantanamo, even though the interrogation tactics
changed in later years, Guantanamo has become synonymous with the
harsh tactics used by the military at the outset post 9/11.
In a survey published in October 2007, 87% of foreign policy
authorities believed that Guantanamo hurt the U.S. fight against al
Qaeda.281  A response to the survey noted:
At the strategic level, it has undercut the U.S. case around the
world that we represent a world view and a set of values that all
can admire, even those who do not wish to replicate our system
and society in their own countries.  Gitmo has become a symbol
for cruelty and inhumanity that is repugnant to a wide sector of
the world community and a powerful tool that al Qaeda can use to
damage US interest and recruit others to its cause.282
Another response from this survey said that Guantanamo “has hurt
America disastrously.  The so-called global war on terrorism depends
fundamentally on America’s moral authority, so that other nations will
want to cooperate with us.  Guantanamo has become a vibrant symbol
of American exceptionalism, but this exceptionalism is unwanted
around the world.”283  In addition, “[o]ur strongest asset internation-
ally was our reputation and credibility on human rights.  We have
squandered that.”284
Senior Intelligence Service Officer for the CIA, Emile Nakhleh,
who interviewed 24 detainees in Guantanamo, believed it was critical
that we shut down the detention center.  He explained to W2G that not
only did Guantanamo not assist our national security, but it “under-
mined even mainstream moderate Muslims in dealing with us because,
you know, if we are going to a certain country to teach their budding
lawyers and judges about the rule of law, the first question they always
ask is, what about Guantanamo.”285
Nakhleh believes that we may have lost the “Guantanamo genera-
tion.”  America now needs to “reach out to rising generations of youth;
the youth that fueled the Arab Spring, the youth that want freedom,
that want entrepreneurship, that want jobs, that want dignity.  We need
to reach out to that generation.”286
As CITF chief Mark Fallon explained, Guantanamo was an “oppor-
tunity lost . . . .  This was an opportunity for us to show the world, set an
example for the world.”287 Instead, we abused our authority.  Fallon
also noted288 that the screening process was “terrible,” that many of the
281. Guantanamo’s Shadow, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.theatlantic
.com/magazine/archive/2007/10/guantanamos-shadow/306212/.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Interview with Emile Nakhleh, Senior Intelligence Service Officer and Direc-
tor of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program, CIA, in S.F., Cal. (Apr. 10, 2013).
286. Id.
287. Interview with Mark Fallon, supra note 10.
288. Id.
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men investigated had done no wrong, had no prosecutorial value, and
also had no intelligence value.289
General Counsel of the Navy Alberto Mora told W2G that
America’s legal policies had affected military operational activities.  He
explained how British soldiers had captured a terrorist in Iraq, but
released him in 48 hours because they could not trust that if he were
transferred to the Americans, the Americans would not abuse him.290
Mora also told how the Australian Navy refused to train with U.S. troops
because of our mistreatment of captives.  And he told how the British
deputy commander of all Afghan forces would leave the room when-
ever detainee operations were discussed because he would not become
complicit in any potential criminal activity in which the U.S.
engaged.291
Mora added how the International Committee of the Red Cross
would complain to him that what they heard about abusive treatment of
prisoners in detention in rogue countries was exactly what the United
States was doing.  These rogue nations would ask the Red Cross why the
Red Cross would complain to them about abuse in their prisons, if the
U.S. was also doing it.292  As Mora told W2G, “for the United States to
be responsible for the increase in detainee abuse as a direct conse-
quence of our policy was predictable but also profoundly shameful.”293
Uruguayan President Jose Mujica Cordano, who in 2014 agreed to
resettle six detainees in his country,294 called Guantanamo Bay prison a
disgrace for the United States.  He said that the U.S. “on the one hand
wants to waive the flag of human rights, and assumes the right to criti-
cize the whole world, and then has this well of shame.”295
Cliff Sloan, who was the State Department’s special envoy for clos-
ing Guantanamo for 18 months, ending on December 31, 2014, wrote
that he was told by a “high-ranking security official from one of our
staunchest allies on counterterrorism,” that “[t]he greatest single action
the United States can take to fight terrorism is to close
Guantanamo.”296
3. As the symbol of our violations of human rights and the rule of
law, Guantanamo has become a recruitment tool.
Guantanamo has become a rallying cry for recruitment.  By harshly
interrogating and mistreating detainees in Guantanamo—along with
the reality that America’s violations of human rights and the rule of law
289. Id.
290. Interview with Alberto Mora, General Counsel, U.S. Navy (Dec. 4, 2010).
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Mary Beth Sheridan, Uruguayan president qgrees to take six detainees from Guanta-
namo, WASH. POST (May 15, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/uruguayan-president-agrees-to-take-six-detainees-from-guantanamo/2014/05/
15/a1a3fca8-dc53-11e3-8009-71de85b9c527_story.html.
295. Id.
296. Cliff Sloan, The Path to Closing Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2015, at 23.
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have become equated with the term Guantanamo—we have provided
terrorist groups the platform to recruit followers and challenge
America’s values.  As United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Navi Pillay, noted, Guantanamo “has become an ideal recruit-
ment tool for terrorists.”297  And such statements do not only come
from human rights activists or from people outside the U.S.
Bagram military interrogator Damien Corsetti also raised the possi-
bility that his brutal interrogations contributed to the recruitment of
terrorists and the killing of others.  As he told W2G,
I mean, I definitely got good intelligence while I was there.  I
saved—at the time immediately through direct action of intelli-
gence I gathered I know I’ve saved lives.  I know I’ve saved U.S.
lives.  I know I’ve saved lives outside of the United States as well.
However, what I deal with now is did my actions to get that infor-
mation over a four-year span in the recruitment of terrorists done
by my actions in the end cost more lives?298
As long as Guantanamo remains open, it continues as a recruit-
ment tool.  The Atlantic magazine wrote that, “[t]he Guantanamo sys-
tem has hurt the U.S. and our fight against Al Qaeda.  We have
abandoned the moral high ground and, through our actions, have
become one of the principle recruiting agents for Islamic
extremism.”299
Jihadist media and propaganda refer to Guantanamo.  For exam-
ple, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, representing the Taliban, has
addressed the hunger strikers “in the notorious Guantanamo prison,”
noting “the abuse of prisoners by the American wardens” and “the bar-
baric and inhumane treatment of the prisoners.”300  In another exam-
ple, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has released a number of issues
of its magazine “Inspire” prominently featuring Guantanamo.301  The
terrorist Islamic State known as ISIS or ISIL has forced American and
other captives to wear the orange jumpsuit identified with Guantanamo
detainees before beheading them.302
297. Guantanamo an ideal recruitment tool for terrorists—UN human rights chief, RT
NEWS (May 27, 2013), https://www.rt.com/news/un-guantanamo-terrorists-violations-
857/.
298. Interview with Damien Corsetti in Ga. (Mar. 4, 2013).
299. Guantanamo’s Shadow, supra note 281.
300. Therese Postel, How Guantanamo Bay’s Existence Helps Al-Qaeda Recruit More Ter-
rorists, THE ATLANTIC (April 12, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2013/04/how-guantanamo-bays-existence-helps-al-qaeda-recruit-more-terrorists/
274956/. The full quote is found at: New statement from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan:
“Strike of Destitute Inmates in Guantanamo Prison Reaches Forty Days”, JIHADOLOGY (Mar. 26,
2013), http://jihadology.net/2013/03/26/new-statement-from-the-islamic-emirate-of-
afghanistan-strike-of-destitute-inmates-in-guantanamo-prison-reaches-forty-days/.
301. Postel, supra note 300.
302. Dan Lamothe, Once again, militants use Guantanamo-inspired orange suit in an
execution, WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/check-
point/wp/2014/08/28/once-again-militants-use-guantanamos-orange-jumpsuit-in-an-exe-
cution/.
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General Colin Powell, who was Secretary of State during the first
four years of the Bush Administration, has been quoted as saying that
unless Guantanamo is closed, it will give “radicals an opportunity to say,
you see, this is what America is all about.  They’re all about torture and
detention centers.”303
4. For young Americans, Guantanamo, torture, and CIDT have
always existed and have become ingrained in our culture.
Recently, a local high school girl interviewed the author of this arti-
cle for a report she was doing on torture and Guantanamo.  As the
author described the events leading up to the opening of Guantanamo,
he realized that the student did not know about the attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11.
September 11, 2001 was a dozen years ago. She was five. Appar-
ently, her history books did not cover such “recent” events.  Nor did her
civics class address 9/11 and its accompanying critical issues of the rule
of law and the due process rights of detainees.  It also seemed that her
parents had never said anything to her about the events of that day, and
how that day had transformed our lives forever.  The events on 9/11
did not precipitate her study of torture and Guantanamo.  Rather, they
had no context to her study.  For her, torture and Guantanamo had
always existed.
Unfortunately, her response was not unusual.  After the author
published a piece about his meeting with the student on Huffington
Post,304 another student posted the following comment on the Huf-
fington Post site:
You make a good point.  I’m in high school, and both European
and American history end in the 80s.  I’ve learned what happened
at 9/11 from talking to my parents, but not in school.  I have to
wonder what other important events I’m missing—after all, recent
history affects the world directly.305
Wells Dixon, habeas attorney for the Center for Constitutional
Rights, confirmed this cultural shift when he spoke to W2G about his
visits to Guantanamo.  He noted that Guantanamo has “become part of
the American landscape.”306  He continued,
[w]hen you go to Guantanamo now and you see these guards who
are 18, 19 years old, you’ll realize, they in all likelihood, don’t
remember America without Guantanamo.  I mean, they’re too
young to remember America before Guantanamo existed.  It’s
303. Postel, supra note 300.
304. Peter Jan Honigsberg, 9/11, A Mystery to the Young, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 10,
2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-jan-honigsberg/911-a-mystery-to-the-
youn_b_3897362.html.
305. Eleanor E., Comment to 9/11, A Mystery to the Young, HUFFINGTON POST
(Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-jan-honigsberg/911-a-mystery-to-
the-youn_b_3897362.html.
306. Interview with J. Wells Dixon, Habeas attorney (May 13, 2014).
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been part of their history and their culture forever, as far as
they’re concerned.307
5. The harsh treatment motivated detainees to become violent,
and/or to turn their anger against the U.S. after their
release.
As described in this section, there are detainees who engaged in
violent activities following their release.  However, although it is not
always known whether detainees engaged in such conduct prior to their
detention, it is likely that some of the Guantanamo detainees became
violent after being subjected to harsh interrogations and held for years
without charges.  It is also likely that detainees who had been violent
when captured turned their anger at the U.S. when released, because of
the harsh interrogations they suffered.  Perhaps detainees who were not
harshly interrogated were, nevertheless, angered by learning that others
in the prison were brutally interrogated.  One could argue that by
unjustly holding and harshly interrogating detainees in Guantanamo
for over a decade, we have contributed to creating the terrorists we
feared.
The numbers below may provide some indication that the harsh
interrogations and military violence in Guantanamo may have led to
detainees’ violent behavior after release.  However, there is no docu-
mented link.  Sociologists and psychologists are encouraged to study
and research this issue in depth.
The statistics on the number of detainees who were violent after
release differ substantially depending on who is doing the counting.  In
January 2014, the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
released a figure of 17%, as to the percentage of prisoners who have
engaged in “terrorist activities,” and another 12% were suspected of
engaging in terrorist activities.308  However, when looking at actions
against the U.S. or its citizens, the New America Foundation lists the
much smaller number of 2.5% confirmed who have engaged in terror-
ist activities against the U.S. or its citizens, and 3.5% who are suspected
of so engaging.309  The Foundation also identified another 3% of for-
mer detainees who are confirmed or suspected of involvement in mili-
tant attacks against non-U.S. targets.310  Adding these numbers
together, one gets 9%, which is approximately 1/3 of the numbers
(17% + 12% = 29%) issued by the Director of National Intelligence.
The Witness to Guantanamo project has interviewed 50 detainees.
Four of them are known to have participated in violent activities after
their release.  All four of the men joined one of the militant splinter
groups supporting the Sunni rebels in Syria, who are in armed conflict
307. Id.
308. Peter Bergen & Bailey Cahall, Opinion, How big a terror risk are former Guanta-
namo prisoners?, CNN.COM (June 8, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/05/opinion/
bergen-guantanamo-risk-of-recidivist-terrorists/.
309. Id.
310. Id.
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with the Assad government.  Two of these men, both Moroccans, died
in Syria.311  A third former detainee was threatened with prosecution by
his home country of Great Britain, although the charges were later
dropped.312  The fourth, and another former detainee from Morocco,
was convicted of recruiting Moroccans to fight against the U.S. in Iraq
in 2007.313  As of June 4, 2014, he has been fighting with the militant
Harakat Sham rebels in Syria.314  A fifth former detainee from Kuwait,
also interviewed by W2G, was accused of belonging to Al Wafi, a terror-
ist organization, before he was taken to Guantanamo.315  He was acquit-
ted of the charge.316  One former detainee from Kuwait, not
interviewed by W2G, became a suicide bomber in Iraq after he was
released.317  It is possible that other people W2G interviewed have also
participated in violent or terrorist activities after their release, but have
not been publicly identified.
6. Noncombatant personnel who worked with detainees and
participated in or observed mistreatment suffered PTSD.
Damien Corsetti, the Bagram interrogator described in Part I, was
assessed a reduced PTSD status after his trial.  Corsetti challenged the
assessment and, ultimately, the government granted Corsetti 100% disa-
bility based on his PTSD.318  Corsetti was unable to work at any job.  “I
have a pretty severe case of PTSD,”319 he told W2G.
W2G did not interview other interrogators who conducted harsh
interrogations, and medical records are protected from public access.
Accordingly, we cannot say whether other Bagram interrogators, who
also participated in illegal and inhumane behavior toward detainees,
also suffered PTSD, and whether they still suffer today.  Nor can we say
whether the military interrogators who participated in torturing al-
Qahtani suffered PTSD.  None of the other three interrogators
311. Maria Abi-Habib, After Guantanamo, Freed Detainees Returned to Violence in Syria
Battlefields, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/after-guantanamo-
freed-detainees-return-to-violence-in-syria-battlefields-1401839291; Interview with
Souleimane Laalami Mohamed (July 13, 2012); Interview with Brahim Benchakroun (July
12, 2012).
312. Interview with Moazzam Begg in Birmingham, U.K. (Aug. 17, 2009); Ian
Cobain, Moazzam Begg freed after terrorism case against him collapses, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 1,
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/01/moazzam-begg-freed-case-
collapses.
313. Interview with Mohammed Mazouz, in Casablanca, Morocco (July 11, 2012).
314. Abi-Habib, supra note 311.
315. Saad Madhi Saad Howash Al Azmi, WIKIPEDIA (Dec. 27, 2016, 1:06), https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saad_Madhi_Saad_Howash_Al_Azmi; see also Lists of former Guanta-
namo Bay detainees alleged to have returned to terrorism, WIKIPEDIA (Feb. 26, 2017, 3:16), http:/
/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lists_of_former_Guantanamo_Bay_detainees_alleged_to_have_
returned_to_terrorism.
316. Saad Madhi Saad Howash Al Azmi, supra note 3145
317. Alissa J. Rubin, Ex-Guanta´namo detainee became suicide bomber in Iraq, U.S. says,
N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/08/world/africa/08iht-
gitmo.1.12688332.html?_r=0.
318. Interview with Damien Corsetti in Ga. (Apr. 16, 2013).
319. Id.
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described in Part II (i.e., Clemente, Nelson, and Bryson), who treated
detainees with a rapport-building approach, spoke of suffering from
PTSD whenW2G interviewed them.
However, at least one study has shown that noncombatants can
develop PTSD without having actually engaged in combat.  Although
the study focused on traumatic combat-related events, it found a corre-
lation between noncombatants witnessing a traumatic event in a hostile
environment and the increased risk for PTSD for the noncomba-
tants.320  Scholars and researchers are encouraged to undertake
research projects into whether noncombatants who either participated
in or witnessed torture or CIDT in Bagram or Guantanamo suffered a
traumatic event leading to PTSD.
In a study of Vietnam veterans, researchers determined that after
controlling for combat exposure, “atrocities exposure was found to be
significantly related to overall PTSD symptom severity.”321  Researchers
have also found that a “moral injury,” causing PTSD-like symptoms, can
occur as a result of mistreatment of enemy combatants and acts of
revenge.322
Professor John Smith, a retired Air Force captain who treated a
guard who had worked at Guantanamo, described the prison guards as
“an overlooked group of victims.”323  One guard reportedly told Smith
that he felt “profoundly guilty about his participation,” which included
preparing detainees for interrogation by handcuffing them in painful
positions, while naked.  The guard was also required to make prisoners
kneel, naked and shackled, on sharp stones.  When he returned to the
U.S., after observing and participating in the abuse of the detainees, the
guard suffered “panic attacks, insomnia, nightmares, flashbacks and
depression,”324 all symptoms of PTSD.
Albert Shimkus served as the commanding officer of the Naval
Hospital at Guantanamo from August 2002 to August 2003.  He told
W2G that certain noncombatant guards manifested symptoms of
aggression and depression because they were affected by their work at
the base and the “difficulty in the environment of Gitmo.”325  These
guards would be provided with psychological counseling, and some-
times removed from their positions.326
A young medic told W2G that after leaving Guantanamo he would
get very angry, and then cry.  “What’s the matter with me?  This is just
320. Alan L. Peterson et al., Documented Combat-Related Mental Health Problems in Mili-
tary Noncombatants, 23 J. OF TRAUMATIC STRESS 674, 674–81 (2010).
321. J.C. Beckham, M.E. Feldman, & A.C. Kirby, Atrocities Exposure in Vietnam Combat
Veterans with Chronic Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Relationship to Combat Exposure, Symptom
Severity, Guilt and Interpersonal Violence, 11 J. OF TRAUMATIC STRESS 777, 783 (1998).
322. Kent D. Drescher et al., An Exploration of the Viability and Usefulness of the Con-
struct of Moral Injury in War Veterans, 17 TRAUMATOLOGY 8, 11 (2001).
323. James Randerson, Guantanamo guards suffer psychological trauma, THE GUARDIAN
(Feb. 25, 2008), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2008/feb/25/guantanamo
.guards.
324. Id.
325. Interview with Albert Shimkus in Wash., D.C. (Aug. 9, 2011).
326. Id.
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not the way a guy acts,” he would ask himself.  He sought out psychiatric
care.327  The psychiatrist gave him medication.  The medic and the psy-
chiatrist only talked briefly about the medic’s experiences in Guanta-
namo.  The psychiatrist was more interested in whether the medication
he had prescribed to the medic was working.  The medic explained to
W2G, “Part of the problem is that the more you talk about it, the more
you dredge it up.  The more dreams I have about it, the more irritable I
get.”
When W2G asked about his parents, he replied, “I don’t know how
much my parents even know.  They picked me up when I got back and
they took me to dinner and they said, well, how was it?  I almost started
to cry and I said, ‘it’s bad.  It’s really not a good place.’”328  And that
was the end of the conversation.
CONCLUSION
John Bellinger was principle lawyer for former Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice and the National Security Counsel.  He was also one
of the people who had drafted the memoranda justifying the use of
drones during the Bush Administration.  He told W2G, “It does seem to
me—as an objective fact, it is clear that the Obama administration has
ramped up dramatically its use of drones while ramping down dramati-
cally its detention of any individual.”  He observed that, “it appears at
least that there has been a preference to simply kill senior Al Qaeda
leaders as opposed to attempting to detain them.”
In other words, Bellinger is indicating that drones are the next iter-
ation of an ill-conceived short-term policy.  It seems as if history is again
repeating itself.  America was not reflective when it initiated harsh inter-
rogation techniques, including torture and CIDT, in Bagram and Guan-
tanamo.  The use of drones to kill people as a substitute for bringing
suspected terrorists to Guantanamo is another policy fraught with dan-
ger to our global reputation.  We must evaluate our use of drones as
weapons of killing, sometimes indiscriminately, today in light of the les-
sons we should have learned from Guantanamo.
As Bellinger explained:
One might imagine that they saw what happened to the Bush
administration with respect to detention and they’ve decided that
trying to detain suspected terrorists is an unsuccessful policy.  The
problem with drone strikes though is that it results in killing not
only of the people you’re targeting but also of civilians as well.
And that it’s not transparent.  I mean, at least the people in Guan-
tanamo, we know who they are.  We can argue whether they ought
to be there or not.
Bellinger added,
It may well be that it’s appropriate to target some or all of these
individuals.  And I have confidence in the senior policy officials in
327. Interview with anonymous medic in S.F., Cal. (Apr. 14, 2012).
328. Id.
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the Obama administration.  But much of the rest of the world I
think is not convinced by this administration simply saying, trust
us, we’re doing this right.
A bipartisan panel of former senior intelligence officers and mili-
tary officials released a report indicating that President Obama’s use of
drones for targeted killings risks putting the U.S. on a “slippery slope”
into a perpetual war.  Further, it noted that the drones set a dangerous
precedent that other countries could use to conduct lethal operations
in the future.329  The report also raised the issue of whether drones
may be creating terrorists even as they are killing them.  “There is no
indication that a U.S. strategy to destroy Al Qaeda has curbed the rise of
Sunni Islamic extremism, deterred the establishment of Shia Islamic
groups or advanced long-term U.S. security interests,” the report
concluded.330
The use of drones today should cause all Americans to pause.
Guantanamo should be a cautionary tale for us all.  As we hear about
the number of targets killed by drones in faraway lands like Pakistan
and Yemen, we must ask ourselves whether drones will become another
stain on America’s image, that is, another Guantanamo.
If and when Guantanamo is closed, the U.S. must begin working to
reestablish its moral high ground.  It must work on again becoming the
beacon for human rights and the rule of law.  It will be a long process,
but it can be done.  The US could regain that lead by doing the right
thing going forward.  Millions of people around the world believed in
Obama when he was first elected.  He received the Nobel Peace Prize
after only four months in office.331  The people around the world
cheered for him, and looked to him to reverse Bush-era policies.  He
brought us hope.
However, he had announced in the early days of his presidency
that he had “a belief that we need to look forward as opposed to look-
ing backwards.”332  Unfortunately, that meant that people in the previ-
ous administration who had authorized harsh interrogations involving
torture and CIDT would not be prosecuted and, if guilty, convicted.  By
not demonstrating to the nation and the world that people who com-
mitted these serious and shameful crimes must be brought to justice,
Obama delivered the message that people who committed such behav-
ior will never be held accountable.
329. Mark Mazzetti, Use of Drones for Killings Risks a War Without End, Panel Concludes
in Report, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/world/use-
of-drones-for-killings-risks-a-war-without-end-panel-concludes-in-report.html.
330. Id.
331. See The Nobel Peace Prize 2009, NOBELPRIZE.ORG (Feb. 28, 2017), http://www.no
belprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/.
332. David Johnston & Charlie Savage, Obama Reluctant to Look into Bush Programs,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/12/us/politics/12inquire
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In addition, Obama has not only refused to prosecute, but has also
continued many of the Bush policies, and has even gone further in
some respects.  For example, he has kept Guantanamo open, although
President Bush had wanted to close it as his term came to an end.333
Obama has also continued to allow the military to commit CIDT, if not
torture, when force-feeding detainees on hunger strikes.334  And, as
noted above, he has expanded the use of drones for killing people,
including American citizens, without any accountability.335
Schools should begin educating their students on 9/11 issues.  We
cannot improve our relations with Muslim countries until we under-
stand why 9/11 happened and how 9/11 was caused by jihadists, and
not by all Muslims, as some uninformed people may believe.  By learn-
ing about 9/11, as well as about Arab culture and the Muslim religion,
the next generations will better understand how to improve relations
and live with Muslims in harmony.
Further research is necessary to study the extent of PTSD suffered
by noncombatants, whether interrogators, medics, guards, or others.
There seem to be few, if any, well-recognized and established studies on
this issue.  Yet, after Guantanamo, PTSD has become a critical concern.
Government officials and military officials must be informed if Ameri-
cans who participated in torture or CIDT, or even observed torture or
CIDT, suffered PTSD.
Hopefully, scholars will pursue and study the research necessary to
support or negate the tentative theories raised in the article.
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